III. 2. 17
(Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads)
The nature of the Logos corresponds to its whole productive activity, and, therefore, the more it is dispersed the more opposed will its products be: so the universe of sense is less a unity than its Logos; it is more of a manifold and there is more opposition in it: and each individual in it will be urged by a greater desire to live and a greater passion for unity.
But passionate desires often destroy their objects, if they are perishable, in the pursuit of their own good: and the part straining towards the whole draws to itself what it can.
So we have good and wicked men, like the opposed movements of a dancer inspired by one and the same art: we shall call one part of his performance ‘good’ and one ‘wicked’ and say that its excellence lies in the opposition.
But then the wicked are no longer wicked?
No: they remain wicked, only their being like that does not originate with themselves.
But surely this excuses them?
No; excuse depends on the Logos, and the Logos does not make us disposed to excuse this sort of people. But if one part of the Logos is a good man, another a bad — and the bad are the larger class — it is like the production of a play: the author gives each actor a part, but also makes use of the characters which they have already. He does not himself rank them as leading actor or second or third, but gives each one suitable words and by that assignment fixes his proper rank.
So every man has his place, a place to fit the good man and one to fit the bad. Each kind of man, then, goes according to nature, and the Logos to the place that suits him, and holds the position he has chosen. There one speaks blasphemies and does crimes, the other speaks and acts in all goodness: for the actors existed before this play and bring their own proper selves to it.