Platão e platonismo

Tag: agathon

  • Authentic Good (MacKenna)

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    It can scarcely prove to be The Good: The Absolute Good cannot be thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it only as something of the nature of good but paying a double allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic Good. Ennead I,2,4 Now if happiness did indeed…

  • Good and Bad (MacKenna)

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    To deny Evil a place among realities is necessarily to do away with the Good as well, and even to deny the existence of anything desirable; it is to deny desire, avoidance and all intellectual act; for desire has Good for its object, aversion looks to Evil; all intellectual act, all Wisdom, deals with Good…

  • Good and Beauty (MacKenna)

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    We may even say that Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence: and the Ugly is also the primal evil; therefore its contrary is at once good and beautiful, or is Good and Beauty: and hence the one method will discover to us the Beauty-Good and the Ugliness-Evil. Ennead I,6,6…

  • good man (MacKenna)

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    Take, for example, Contemplative-Wisdom. If other guides of conduct must be called in to meet a given need, can this virtue hold its ground even in mere potentiality? And what happens when the virtues in their very nature differ in scope and province? Where, for example, Sophrosyne would allow certain acts or emotions under due…

  • good or evil (MacKenna)

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    But, to begin with, it is surely unsound to deny that good of life to animals only because they do not appear to man to be of great account. And as for plants, we need not necessarily allow to them what we accord to the other forms of life, since they have no feeling. It…

  • Highest Good (MacKenna)

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    And, further, these Civic Virtues – measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as Matter to their forming – are like to the measure reigning in the over-world, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme; for, while utter measurelessness is brute…

  • nature of the Good (MacKenna)

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    For the moment let us define the nature of the Good as far as the immediate purpose demands. The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term…

  • good man

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    Socrates : I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude : for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men ; you…

  • good of the soul

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    Soc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only GOOD OF THE SOUL is pleasure ; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other GOOD OF THE SOUL,…

  • good soul

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    (376b) Socrates : Is not, then, a good man he who has a GOOD SOUL, and a bad man he who has a bad one ? LESSER HIPPIAS Socrates : It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is,…

  • goods of the soul

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    Soc. Next, let us consider the GOODS OF THE SOUL : they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like ? MENO Str. In the second place, he was a merchant in the GOODS OF THE SOUL. SOPHIST Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy,…

  • Summum bonum (agathon) [Boutot, 1987:157-158]

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  • O Bem (agathon) [Boutot, 1987:155-157]

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  • agathon (Gobry)

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    gr. αγαθόν, agathón: o que é bom, o bem, um princípio supremo, summum bonum. Na filosofia grega, o Bem é o objetivo que se oferece à vida de todo homem. É ele a fonte da felicidade (eudaimonia), busca incessante da alma. Mas só o sábio pode atingir o Bem, pois só ele sabe usar convenientemente…

  • Plotino – Tratado 1,6-9 – o Bem e o Uno (versões)

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    Una vez, pues, que el alma se ha purificado, se hace forma y razón, se vuelve totalmente incorpórea e intelectiva y se integra toda ella en lo divino, de donde nacen la fuente de lo bello y todas las cosas de la misma estirpe parecidas a lo bello. Un alma subida a la inteligencia realza,…

  • Tratado 09 (VI, 9) – Sobre o Bem ou o Uno

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    Neste tratado Plotino apresenta pela primeira vez de maneira sistemática sua teoria do primeiro princípio, segundo a qual deve-se admitir uma realidade absolutamente simples e rigorosamente “una” além do mundo inteligível e do Intelecto. A introdução deste princípio representa, como se sabe, a inovação filosófica fundamental que aporta Plotino à tradição platônica precedente, que estabelecia…

  • Fraile (Historia) – Plotino, o Uno-Bem

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    1.° El Uno-Bien.—Por encima de todos los seres, más allá del ser, de la vida y del pensamiento, está el Uno-Bien, que es la primera Causa no causada (anaitios aition), y el primer principio, único, inmóvil e inmutable, indivisible, imparticipable (amethektos), incognoscible e inefable. No puede encerrarse en conceptos ni expresarse con palabras. La propiedad…

  • Bem/Uno que excede o Intelecto ou Noûs (Bazán)

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    El pensador neoplatónico nos dice que el alma humana purificada, o sea, una vez que ha conseguido por el ejercicio habitual de (31) las virtudes de la templanza, la fortaleza y la prudencia, como poco antes refirió1, distanciarse de las atracciones que originándose en el cuerpo pugnan por conservarla apegada a la individualidad y a…

  • Noûs and Good

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    VI. 7. 22 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) (The beauty of the Forms in Noûs cannot move the soul to love by itself; it must be illumined, coloured, wakened to life by the Good) When anyone sees this light (from the Good), then he is really moved to the Forms and longs for…

  • Aristóteles – O Bem (Thomas Taylor)

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    Again, it is evident that what Aristotle now says, does not by any means subvert the subsistence of the first good, and which is nothing else than the good. For that it is this which benefits all things; and that every thing by an analogous participation of it is said to be good, will not…