I. Since evils are here, and revolve from necessity about this (terrestrial) place, but the soul wishes to fly from evils, it is requisite to fly from hence. “What therefore is the flight ? To become similar, says Plato, to God. But this will be effected, if we become just and holy, in conjunction with (intellectual) prudence, and in short if we are (truly) virtuous. If therefore we are assimilated through virtue, is it to one who possesses virtue ? But to whom are we assimilated ? To divinity. Are we then assimilated to that nature which appears to possess the virtues in a more eminent degree, and also to the soulsoul of the world, and to the intellect which is the leader in it, in which there is an admirable wisdom? For it is reasonable to suppose that while we are here, we are assimilated to this intellect. Or is it not in the first place dubious, whether all the virtues are present with this intellect, such as temperance and fortitude, since there is nothing which can be dreadful to it ? For nothing externally happens to it, nor does any thing pleasing approach to it, which when not present it may become desirous of possessing, or apprehending. But if it also has an appetite directed to the intelligibles, after which our souls aspire, it is evident that ornament and the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has therefore this intellect these virtues? Or may we not say, it is not reasonable to suppose, that it possesses what are called the political virtues, viz. prudence indeed, about the part that deliberates and consults; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the agreement and concord of the part that desires, with the reasoning power; and justice, in each of these parts performing its proper office, with respect to governing and being governed. Shall we say therefore, that we are not assimilated to divinity according to the political virtues, but according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation ? But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according to the political virtues ? Or is it not absurd that we should not in any respect be assimilated according to these ? For rumour also says, that these are divine. We must say, therefore, that we are after a manner assimilated by them ; but that the assimilation is according to the greater virtues. In either way, however, it happens that divinity has virtues, though not such as the political.
If, therefore, some one should grant, that though it is not possible to be assimilated according to such virtues as these, since we subsist differently with reference to other virtues, yet nothing hinders but that we by our virtues may be assimilated to that which does not possess virtue. But after what manner ? Thus, if any thing is heated by the presence of heat, it is necessary that also should be hot from whence the heat is derived. And if any thing is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary that fire itself also should be hot by the presence of heat (For pyros thermou here, I read thermotetos). To the first of these assertions, however, it may be said, that there is heat in fire, but a connascent heat, so that it will follow from analogy, that virtue is indeed adventitious to the soul, but connascent with that nature from whence it is derived by imitation. And with respect to the argument from fire, it may be said that divinity possesses virtue, but that virtue in him is in reality greater than virtue (because it subsists causally). But if that virtue indeed, of which the soul participates, was the same with that from which it is derived, it would be necessary to speak in this manner. Now, however, the one is different from the other. For neither is the sensible the same with the intelligible house (or with that which is the object of intellectual conception) though it is similar to it. And the sensible house participates of order and ornament; though there is neither order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in the productive principle of it in the mind. Thus, therefore, we participate from thence (i.e. from divinity) of ornament, order and consent, and these things pertain to virtue, but there consent, ornament and order, are not wanted, and therefore divinity has no need of virtue. We are, however, nevertheless assimilated to what he possesses, through the presence of virtue. And thus much for the purpose of showing, that it is not necessary virtue should be there, though we are assimilated to divinity by virtue. But it is also necessary to introduce persuasion to what has been said, and not to be satisfied with compulsion alone.