V. We must, however, show how far purification proceeds. For thus it will be evident to whom the similitude is made, and with what God the soul becomes the same. But this is especially to enquire how far it is possible to be purified from anger and desire, and all the other perturbations, such as pain, and things of a kindred nature, and to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps, indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for the soul to collect itself as it were, from different places, so as to become entirely impassive, and to make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be only remedies and liberations from pain1, in order that the soul may not be disturbed [in its energies]. It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and diminishing its power, in consequence of [the rational part] not being co-passive with it. And besides this also, in takiug away anger to the utmost of our ability, and if possible, entirely ; but if not, the rational part must not at the same time be angry, but the anger must be the passion of another part, and unaccompanied with deliberation. And this sudden impulse must be small and imbecile. Fear, however, must be entirely removed; for the purified soul will fear nothing. Here, also, the energy must be unattended with deliberation, except it be requisite to admonish. With respect to desire, it is evident that there must not be a desire of any thing base. And as to the desire of meats and drinks for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself will be without it. This likewise will be the case with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is desirous of connection, it will be I think in the natural way, and this not unattended with deliberation. If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it will only be so far as it is accompanied with a precipitate imagination2. But, in short, the [rational] soul herself will be purified from all these. She will also wish to render the irrational part pure, so that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the agitation may not be vehement, but small, and immediately dissolved by proximity to the rational part. Just as if some one being near to a wise man, should partake of his wisdom by this proximity, or should become similar to him, or through reverence should not dare to do any thing which the good man is unwilling to do. Hence, there will be no contest. For reason being present will be sufficient, which the inferior part will reverence, so as even to be itself indignant, if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present; and it will on this account blame its own imbecility.
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, says, that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and satisfy the indigence of nature, hut perfect no energy of the rational part of the soul. ↩
In the original protypous; but it should doubtless be as in the above translation, propetous. For this is the word used by Marinus, in his Life of Proclus, when speaking of the cathartic virtues of that philosopher, and alluding to this passage in Plotinus. ↩