I. Beauty1, for the most part, consists in objects of sight: but it is also received through the ears, by the skilful composition of words, and consonant proportions of sounds; for in every species of harmony, beauty is to be found. And if we rise from sense into the regions of soul, we shall there perceive studies and offices, actions and habits, sciences and virtues, invested with a much larger portion of beauty. But whether there is, above these, a still higher beauty, will appear as we advance in its investigation. What is it then, which causes bodies to appear fair to the sight, sounds beautiful to the ear, and science and virtue lovely to the mind? May we not enquire after what manner they all partake of beauty? Whether beauty is one and the same in all? Or, whether the beauty of bodies is one kind, and the beauty of souls of another? And again, what these are, if they are two? Or, what beauty is, if perfectly simple, and one? For some things, as bodies, are doubtless beautiful, not from the nature of the subjects in which they reside, but rather by some kind of participation: but others again appear to be essentially beautiful, or beauties themselves; and such is the nature of virtue. For, with respect to the same bodies, they appear beautiful to one person, and the reverse of beauty to another; as if the essence of body were a thing different from the essence of beauty. In the first place, then, what is that, which, by its presence, causes the beauty of bodies? Let us reflect, what most powerfully attracts the eyes of beholders, and seizes the spectator with rapturous delight: for if we can find what this is, we may perhaps use it as a ladder, enabling us to ascend into the region of beauty, and survey its immeasurable extent.
It is the general opinion, that a certain commensuration of parts to each other, and to the whole, with the addition of colour, generates that beauty which is the object of sight; and that in the commensurate and the moderate alone, the beauty of every thing consists. But from such an opinion, the compound only, and not the simple, can be beautiful; the single parts will have no peculiar beauty; and will only merit that appellation, by conferring to the beauty of the whole. But it is surely necessary, that a lovely whole, should consist of beautiful parts; for the fair can never rise out of the deformed. But from such a definition, it follows, that beautiful colours, and the light of the sun, since they are simple, and do not receive their beauty from commensuration, must be excluded the regions of beauty. Besides, how, from such an hypothesis, can gold be beautiful? Or the glittering of night, and the glorious spectacle of the stars? In like manner the most simple musical sounds, will be foreign from beauty; though, in a song wholly beautiful, every note must be beautiful, as necessary to the being of the whole. Again, since the same proportion remaining, the same face is to one person beautiful, and to another the reverse, is it not necessary, to call the beauty of the commensurate one kind of beauty, and the commensuration another kind; and that the commensurate is fair, by means of something else? But, if transferring themselves to beautiful studies, and fair discourses, they shall assign as the cause of beauty in these, the proportion of measure; what is that which, in beautiful sciences, laws, or disciplines, is called commensurate proportion? Or, in what manner can speculations themselves be called mutually commensurate? If it be said, because of the inherent concord; we reply, that there is a certain concord and content in evil souls, a conformity of sentiment, in believing (as it is said) that temperance is folly, and justice generous ignorance. It appears, therefore, that the beauty of the soul is every virtue; and this species of the beautiful possesses far greater reality than any of the superior we have mentioned. But, after what manner in this, is commensuration to be found? For it is neither like the symmetry in magnitude, or in numbers. And since the parts of the soul are many, in what proportion and synthesis, in what temperament of parts, or concord of speculations, does beauty consist? Lastly, of what kind is the beauty of intellect itself, abstracted from every corporeal concern, and intimately conversing with itself alone?
It is necessary to inform the Platonic reader, that the Beautiful, in the present discourse, is considered according to its most general acceptation, as the same with the Good: though, according to a more accurate distinction, as Plotinus himself informs us, the Good is considered as the fountain and principle of the Beautiful. I think it likewise proper to observe, that as I have endeavoured, by my paraphrase, to render as much as possible the obscure parts evident, and to expand those sentences which are so very much contracted in the original, I shall be sparing of notes; for my design is not to accommodate the sublimest truths to the meanest understandings (as this would be a contemptible and useless prostitution), but to render them perspicuous to truly liberal philosophic minds. My reasons for adopting this mode of paraphrase, may be seen in the preface to my translation of The Hymns of Orpheus. ↩