V. Because, however, such a nature as this, thus all-beautiful and perpetual, subsists about the one, proceeding from and with it, and in no respect departing from it, but always abides about and in the one, and lives according to it, hence I think it is beautifully and with a profundity of decision, said by Plato, that ” eternity abides in one,”1 that he might not only lead it to the one which is in itself, but that he might also in a similar manner lead the life of being about the one. This, therefore, is that which we investigate, and that which thus abides is eternity. For this very thing, and which thus abides, which is the energy of a life abiding from itself, subsisting with and in the one, and which neither in existing nor living is false and fictitious, will certainly be eternity. For to be truly, is never not to be, nor to be otherwise. But the former of these is to be invariably the same; and the latter is to be without diversity. Hence it has not in any respect, another and another. You must not, therefore, conceive it to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is any thing of prior and posterior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the is, is the truest of all the things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life; — if this be the case, again that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. But when we say that it is always, and that it is not at one time being, and at another time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus speak for the sake of perspicuity ; since the term always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incorruptible nature. And farther still, it signifies that it never fails. Perhaps, however, it would be better to call it only being. But though being is a name sufficient to essence, yet since some are of opinion that generation also is essence, it is requisite for the sake of discipline to add the term always. For one thing is not being, but another perpetual being ; as neither is a philosopher one thing, but a true philosopher another. Because, however, some persons are only philosophers in appearance, the addition of a true philosopher became necessary. Thus, likewise, the always was added to being, and being to the always. So that it was called axon; on which account the always was assumed, in order that the conjunction of being with the always, might indicate that which is truly being. The always, likewise, must be contracted into a power devoid of interval, and which besides what it now possesses, is not in want of any thing. But it possesses every thing. Hence it is every thing and being, and is not indigent of any thing. Nor is a nature of this kind, full indeed in one respect, but deficient in another. For that which exists in time, though it may seem to be as perfect as is sufficient to body, yet it is perfect through soul, and is in want of something future, because it is deficient in time of which it is indigent; so that it exists together with time, if it is present with it, and being imperfect, runs in conjunction with it. On this account, therefore, it is equivocally said to be a perfect being. That, however, which is a thing of such a kind, as neither to be in want of futurity, nor to be measured by some other time, nor to be in futurity infinite, and this infinitely, but now possesses that which it ought to be ; — this is that after which our intellectual conception aspires; the being of which is not derived from a certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all quantity. For it is fit, since it is not of a definite quantity, that it should not at all come into contact with quantity, lest the life of it being divided, should lose its pure impartibility; but that it should be both in life and essence impartible. When, however, it is said in the ” Timaeus ” that the demiurgus was good, this must be referred to the conception of the universe, signifying that what is beyond the universe, does not originate from a certain time ; so that neither is the world allotted a certain temporal beginning, since the cause of its existence is the source of priority. At the same time, however, Plato thus speaking for the sake of perspicuity, blames afterwards this expression was good, as not altogether rightly employed in things which are allotted what is called and is intellectually conceived to be, an eternal subsistence.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 45,5 (III,7,5) — Determinações positivas da eternidade
- Bouillet: Tratado 45 (III, 7) – DE L’ÉTERNITÉ ET DU TEMPS
- Enéada III, 7 – Do tempo e da eternidade
- Enéada III, 7, 1 — Introdução
- Enéada III, 7, 10 — Tempo como acompanhamento do movimento
- Enéada III, 7, 11 — O tempo resulta da descida da alma
- Enéada III, 7, 12 — A temporalidade do mundo sensível
- Enéada III, 7, 13 — O movimento do céu não é o tempo
- Enéada III, 7, 2 — Exame crítico e rejeição de teorias platônicas que identificam a eternidade
- Enéada III, 7, 3 — Primeira abordagem da eternidade
- Enéada III, 7, 4 — O ser e a eternidade