XVI. That it is necessary, therefore, there should be something after the first, has been elsewhere asserted by us. And, in short, we have said that this which is next to the first (principle of things) is power, and an inestimable power. This, likewise, is rendered credible from all other things, because there is nothing even among the last of things which has not a generative power. Now, however, we must say, that in things which are generated, the progression is not to the upward, but to the downward, and to a greater multitude, and that the principle of particulars is itself more simple (than its effects). Hence, that which produced the sensible world will not be itself the sensible world, but intellect and the intelligible world. Hence, too, that which is prior to the intelligible world, and which generated it, is something more simple than intellect and the intelligible world. For that which is multitudinous does not originate from multitude, but from that which is not multitude. For if the source of it was multitudinous, it would not be the principle, but the principle would be some other thing prior to it. It is necessary, therefore, to refer all things to that which is truly one, and which is superior to all multitude, and to every kind of (participable) simplicity, if it is truly simple. But how is that which is generated from it, multitudinous and universal reason, since it is evident it is not itself reason ? If however it is not reason, how can reason proceed from that which is not1 reason ? And how can that which is boniform proceed from the good ? For what does it possess in itself that can cause it to be denominated boniform ? Is it because it subsists with invariable sameness ? But what does this contribute to the good ? For we seek after a sameness of subsistence when good is present. Or do we not first investigate that from which it, is not proper to depart, because it is good ? But if it is not good, it is better to abandon the pursuit of it. Is it therefore considered by us as boniform, to live abiding in good voluntarily, and with invariable sameness? Hence, if intellect is satisfied with living after this manner, it evidently seeks after nothing else. It appears, therefore, that a sameness of subsistence is desirable, because what is present is sufficient. All things, however, being now present to intellect, to live is desirable; and this when all things are in such a manner present with it, as not to be different from it. But if all life is present with this, and a life perspicuous and perfect; in this, soul and every intellect subsist, and nothing is wanting to it either of life or intellect. Hence it is sufficient to itself, and seeks after nothing farther. But if this be the case, it possesses in itself, that which it would investigate if it were not present. It possesses, therefore, in itself the good, or a thing of such a kind as we call life and intellect, or something else which is accidental to these. If, however, this is the good, there will be nothing beyond these. But if the good is beyond these, a life tending to this, suspended from it, having its subsistence from, and living according to it, will evidently be good. For the good is the principle of intellect. It is necessary, therefore, that the good should be more excellent than life and intellect. For thus intellect, and the life which it contains, will be converted to it, since the life of intellect possesses in itself an imitation of the good, according to which intellect lives, and this is also the case with intellect itself, whatever this imitation may be.
XVII. What then is better than a most wise, irreprehensible, and unerring life ? What more excellent than an intellect possessing all things ? Or than all life, and every intellect ? If, therefore, we should say that the maker of these is more excellent, and should relate how he made them, and show that nothing better than him can present itself to our view, our reasoning will not proceed to any thing else, but will stop there. It is necessary, however, to ascend, both on account of many other considerations, and because self-sufficiency to this intellect is the result of all the things of which1 it consists. But each of these is evidently indigent, because each participates of the same one, and participates of one in consequence of not being the one itself. What then is that of which this intellect participates, and which causes it to exist, and to be all things at once ? If, however, it causes it to be every thing, and the multitude of it is sufficient to itself through the presence of the one, and if also it is evidently effective of essence and self-sufficiency, it will not be essence, but beyond this, and beyond self-sufficiency. Is what we have said therefore sufficient, or is the soul yet parturient with something else, and in a still greater degree ? Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite that the soul should now become impelled towards the one, being filled with parturient conceptions, about it. Again, however, let us try if we cannot find a certain charm for this parturiency. Perhaps, indeed, he will accomplish this, who frequently enchants himself from what has now been said. What other new enchantment, therefore, as it were, is there ? For the charm which runs above all realities, and above the truths which we participate, immediately flies away from him who wishes to speak of and energize discursively about the one; since it is necessary that the dianoetic power, in order that it may speak of any thing, should assume another and another thing. For thus there will be a discursive energy. In that, however, which is perfectly simple, there is nothing1 discursive ; but it is sufficient to come into contact with it intellectually. That, however, which comes into contact with it, when it is in contact, is neither able to say any thing, nor has leisure to speak; but afterwards (when it falls off from this contact) reasons about it. Then also it is requisite to believe that we have seen it, when the soul receives a sudden light. For this light is from him, and is him. And then it is proper to think that he is present, when like another God entering into the house of someone who invokes him, he fills it with splendour.2 For unless he entered, he would not illuminate it. And thus the soul would be without light, and without the possession of this God. But when illuminated, it has that which it sought for. This likewise is the true end to the soul, to come into contact with his light, and to behold him through it; not by the light of another thing; but to perceive that very thing itself through which it sees. For that through which it is illuminated, is the very thing which it is necessary to behold. For neither do we see the sun through any other than the solar light. How, therefore, can this be accomplished ? By an ablation of all things.
- Tratado 49 (V, 3, 11-15) — OF GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM. (Thomas Taylor)
- Tratado 49 (V, 3, 5-10) — OF GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM. (Thomas Taylor)
- Tratado 49 (V, 3) — OF GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM. (Thomas Taylor)
It is necessary here to supply or. ↩
Plotinus, in what he here says, doubtless alludes to the following lines in the 19th book of the ” Odyssey,” when Ulysses and Telemachus remove the weapons out of the armory :
“Minerva preceded them, having a golden lamp, with which she produced a very beautiful light; on perceiving which, Telemachus thus immediately addressed his father: O father, this is certainly a most admirable thing which presents itself to my eyes. For the walls of the house, the beautiful spaces between the rafters, the fir beams, and the columns, appear to me to rise in radiance, as if on fire. Certainly some one of the Gods is present who inhabit the extended heaven. But the wise Ulysses thus answered him : Be silent, repress your intellect, and do not speak. For this is the custom of the Gods who dwell in Olympus.” Homer, therefore, indicates by this, that to the reception of divine illumination, silence, and a cessation of all mental energy, are requisite. ↩