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Aristóteles em De Anima 3.2, 425b12-28 levanta uma preocupação se pode haver uma regressão ad infinitum de tipos de faculdade para estar consciente do que vemos, e estar consciente de estar consciente que vemos. Mais plausível seria a ameaça de que há uma regressão infinita de atos individuais de tal consciência, mas Aristóteles, veremos, pode também ter se referido a esta preocupação.
[…]Aristóteles segue o Cármides de Platão tomando a visão como seu exemplo central para discutir a autoconsciência. Seu veredito que não vemos o fato que estamos vendo, mas o percebemos pelo uso de nossa vista. A diferença entre ver e perceber pela vista é ilustrada pela referência ao caso da escuridão, que não vemos, mas percebemos indiretamente pela tentativa de ver. Isto soluciona todos os problemas que Aristóteles levanta.
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Aristotle at On the Soul 3.2, 425b12-28 raises the second problem, whether there might be an infinite regress of types of faculty for being aware that we see, and being aware of being aware that we see. More plausible would be the threat that there is an infinite regress of individual acts of such awareness, but Aristotle, we shall see, may have addressed this worry too. Worries about infinite regress in self-awareness are also a modern anxiety.
The simplest answer is well explained, for example, by Colin Radford for the parallel case of a regress of knowing that we know. As in the song ‘I thought you thought I was thinking’, Radford shows that it is too complicated for the human mind to indulge in many iterations of knowing that one knows, by telling a story whose twists and turns would facilitate a number, but only a small number, of iterations. Any regress will be finite, and it is a mistake to think that we are aware of every act of awareness.
But does this mean that inevitably there will be in each case some act of which we are not aware? Yes, for if I think of all my acts of thinking, and additionally think that I am thinking of them, I will still not yet be thinking that I am thinking of the last act. But there is nothing objectionable about admitting that one act will be overlooked. There is no level at which my latest act of awareness of awareness is in principle immune to inspection. It is merely fatigue that makes me leave one such act uninspected. A divine mind, if infinite, might be able to inspect infinitely many, but we cannot.
Alexander(?) (Quaest. 3.7, at 92,31) takes it that Aristotle’s aim in our passage is precisely to stop a regress of acts of awareness when he says at On the Soul 3.2, 425b26 ff. that there is a sense in which an act of perceiving is numerically identical with what it perceives. In that case, a regress of acts of awareness will not even begin, and this is the view that Franz Brentano endorses, drawing on Aristotle. There would still, however, be a regress of descriptions of the one act, with the last description being overlooked, if the regress is finite.
Aristotle (On the Soul 3.2, 425b12-28), follows Plato’s Charmides in taking vision as his central example for discussing self-awareness. His verdict is that we do not see the fact that we are seeing, but perceive it by using our sight. The difference between seeing and perceiving by sight is illustrated by reference to the case of darkness, which is similar in the relevant respect, since we do not see, but perceive indirectly (enparerg6i) by trying to use our sight (and in this particular case failing). This solves all the problems that Aristotle raises.