Categoria: Enéada IV
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source.
SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. 8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We have already shown that there is one Soul (the…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. 7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by some. It only means what Plato desired to assert…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 6) — Why should creation be predicated of the universal soul and not of the human?
WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE HUMAN? 6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things within herself, and…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 5) — Souls retain both their unity and differences on different levels.
SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS. 5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such a doctrine would be equivalent…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 4) — Intellectual difficulty of the soul being one and yet in all beings.
INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS. 4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences of this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the universal Soul’s simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings? How does it happen that some souls are…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 3) — Consciousness of some part of the body to the whole consciousness?
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS? 3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of the entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force us to the conclusion either that…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte
CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER. 2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that souls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects, and the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that they are parts (of the universal Soul). We…
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Guthrie: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo
PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. 1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our researches rewarded by…
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Enéada IV
Na Enéada IV, Porfírio reuniu os tratados que concernem a alma. La precaria y relativa unidad que testimonian los tratados plotinianos, consecuencia evidente de una enseñanza de carácter oral, falta de preparación y de método preconcebidos, pudiera parecer contradicha por la armoniosa disposición de las lecciones de la Enéada cuarta, en la cual no sólo…
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MacKenna: Tratado 21 (IV, 1) Da essência da alma (1).
The Fourth Ennead First tractate. On the essence of the soul (1).
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MacKenna: Tratado 21,1 (IV,1,1) — A alma é intermediária entre a realidade indivisível e a realidade divisível
1. In the Intellectual Kosmos dwells Authentic Essence, with the Intellectual-Principle (Divine Mind) as the noblest of its content, but containing also souls, since every soul in this lower sphere has come thence: that is the world of unembodied spirits while to our world belong those that have entered body and undergone bodily division. There…
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Bouillet: Tratado 21 (IV, 1) – DE L’ESSENCE DE L’ÂME
L’essence de l’intelligence est complètement indivisible ; celle du corps est complètement divisible. L’âme a une nature intermédiaire ; elle est à la fois divisible et indivisible : divisible, parce qu’elle s’unit au corps ; indivisible, parce qu’elle reste unie an monde intelligible.
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Enéada IV, 1, 1 – Como se diz que a alma é intermediária entre a realidade indivisível e a realidade divisível
Tradução a partir da versão de Guthrie Quarta Enéada Primeiro Tratado. Da essência da alma1. É no mundo inteligível (kosmos noetos) que habita o verdadeiro ser (ousia). A inteligência (noûs) é o melhor que existe no alto; mas também há almas (psyche); pois é de lá que desceram para ali. Apenas, as almas não têm…
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Enéada IV, 1 – Como se diz que a alma é intermediária entre a realidade indivisível e a realidade divisível
Por lo pronto, en el tratado primero de la Enéada cuarta, que es una exegesis de algo ya expuesto en el Timeo platónico, Plotino deja zanjada una cuestión fundamental en torno a la esencia del alma: la de su vinculación real a las razones de ese mundo inteligible que es, en definitiva, tanto para Plotino…
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Guthrie: Tratado 21 (IV, 1) – Of the Being of the Soul.
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST. Of the Being of the Soul. It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being. Intelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also souls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have no bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are…
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Tratado 21 (IV, 1) – A alma é intermediária entre as realidades indivisível e divisível
Plotin Traités 7-21. Dir. Trad. Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau. GF-Flammarion, 2003 Plotino nos tratados 2, 4, 6 e 8 já tinha se beneficiado da frase do Timeu platônico que afirma da alma que ela é feita de uma mistura de indivisível e divisível “no corpo”, para sustentar que a alma não se divide senão…
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Brisson & Pradeau: Doutrina de Plotino
Excertos da introdução da nova tradução francesa das Enéadas, de Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau Em geral na tradução das Enéadas, assim como nos estudos de seu pensamento, segue-se o uso que adota uma inicial maiúscula para as palavras que indicam “princípios”, quer dizer realidades verdadeiras que engendram e explicam o que vem em seguida.…
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Tratado 21 (IV, 1) – Como se diz que a alma é intermediária entre a realidade indivisível…
Tradução a partir da versão de MacKenna Quarta Enéada Primeiro Tratado. Da essência da alma (1). 1. No Cosmos Intelectual habita a Essência Autêntica, com o Princípio-Intelectual (Mente Divina) como o mais nobre de seu conteúdo, mas contendo também almas, uma vez que toda alma nesta esfera mais baixa veio de lá: ou seja do…
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Soul in its Relation to Nous (II)
IV. I (Armstrong Selections from the Enneads) (Souls exist in the world of Noûs, in the state of unity proper to that world: but they have the capacity to descend into the material world, where they are divided and separated spatially into different bodies: but even in this lower world they do not entirely lose…
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Igal: Tratado 4,2 (IV,2,2) – Análise dicotômica da divisibilidade e da indivisibilidade da alma
2. La naturaleza del alma, pues, ha de ser tal que no pueda haber al lado de ella ni un alma que sea sólo indivisible, o sólo divisible, debiendo contar necesariamente con estas dos propiedades. Porque si el alma, al igual que los cuerpos, tuviese partes distintas en lugares también diferentes, cuando una de sus…