Categoria: Enéada I
-
Bouillet: Tratado 53,12 (I, 1, 12) — A alma ao mesmo tempo impassível e castigável
XII. Si l’âme ne peut pécher, comment se fait-il qu’elle soit punie? Cette opinion est en complet désaccord avec la croyance universellement admise que l’âme commet des fautes, qu’elle les expie, qu’elle subit des punitions dans les enfers et qu’elle passe dans de nouveaux corps. Quoiqu’il semble nécessaire d’opter entre ces deux opinions, peut-être pourrait-on…
-
Bouillet: Tratado 53,1 (I, 1, 1) — Distinções psicológicas na alma
I. A quel principe appartiennent le plaisir et la peine, la crainte et la hardiesse, le désir et l’aversion, enfin la douleur? Est-ce à l’âme (pure), ou à l’âme se servant du corps comme d’un instrument, ou bien à une troisième chose formée des deux premières? Et cette troisième chose elle-même, on peut encore la…
-
Bouillet: Tratado 53,13 (I, 1, 13) — Relação do “nós” e da “alma”
XIII. Enfin, quel est le principe qui fait toutes ces recherches? Est-ce nous? Est-ce l’âme? C’est nous, mais au moyen de l’âme. S’il en est ainsi, comment cela se fait-il? Est-ce nous qui considérons l’âme parce que nous la possédons, ou bien est-ce l’âme qui se considère elle-même ? C’est l’âme qui se considère elle-même.…
-
symmetria
gr. symmétria, συμμετρία: Platão via como caracterizando a composição ontológica do Bem. Proporção perfeita nas misturas (krasis), é um princípio cardinal para a fisiologia de Aristóteles. : La notion de summetría, traduite ici par proportion, désigne plus et autre chose que la « symétrie » dont parlent la zoologie ou la géométrie pour décrire la…
-
Bréhier: Tratado 53 (I, 1) – Qu’est-ce que l’animal ? Qu’est-ce que l’homme ?
ENNÉADE I, 1 (53) – Qu’est-ce que l’animal ? Qu’est-ce que l’homme ?
-
Aubry: Comentário à Enéada I-1-1a6
O primeiro parágrafo do Tratado-53 tem algo de confuso: se ele anuncia o plano do tratado, é sob a forma, enganosa, de uma investigação sobre as faculdades (dynamis); Plotino passa em revista, segundo uma ordem que se reconhece hierárquica, uma multiplicidade de estados e de operações para perguntar qual é o sujeito (hypokeimenon). Ora esta…
-
thanatos
gr. θάνατος, θάνατον. “A morte é separação entre alma e corpo” (Fédon). “A morte nada é para nós” (Epicuro). “A morte não é um mal, mas o mal é a opinião de que a morte é um mal” (Epiteto). Cette définition de la mort vient du Phédon : « C’est bien cela, être mort :…
-
Bréhier: Tratado 53,1 (I, 1, 1) — A questão do “sujeito”
1. À quel sujet appartiennent le plaisir et la peine, la crainte et la confiance, le désir et l’aversion ? Est-ce à l’âme ? Est-ce à l’âme usant du corps ? Est-ce à un troisième être composé de l’âme et du corps ? Et cette dernière question se dédouble — est-ce au mélange lui-même ?…
-
ENNÉADES I, 1 (53) – extraits sur le corps
À quel sujet appartiennent le plaisir et la peine, la crainte et la confiance, le désir et l’aversion ? Est-ce à l’âme ? Est-ce à l’âme usant du corps ? Est-ce à un troisième être composé de l’âme et du corps ? Et cette dernière question se dédouble – est-ce au mélange lui-même ? Est-ce…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,9 (I, 1, 9) — Origem dos males, pecados e erros
ORIGIN OF EVILS, SINS, AND ERRORS. 9. In this conception of the soul, she will be foreign to the cause of the evils which the man does and suffers. These refer to the organism, that common part, understood as above. Although opinion be deceptive, and makes us commit much evil, and although opinion and ratiocination…
-
Corrigan: Comments Enneads I,1 (53)
A major problem for any reader of the Enneads (and particularly of III, 6 (26), “On the impassibility of incorporeals”) is that compound entities, human beings among them, seem to be sandwiched between two different kinds of impassibility, or incapacity to feel anything: an unfeeling matter and an unfeeling soul! The world may indeed be…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,1 (I, 1, 1) — Distinções psicológicas na alma
PSYCHOLOGIC DISTINCTIONS IN SOUL. 1. To what part of our nature do pleasure (hedone) and grief (lype), fear (phobos) and boldness (tharre) desire (epithymia) and aversion (apostrophe), and, last, pain (tinos), belong? Is it to the soul (psyche) (herself)1, or to the soul when she uses the body (soma) as an instrument2, or to some…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,8 (I, 1, 8) — Relação individual com o intelecto cósmico
INDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH COSMIC INTELLECT. 8. What is our relation with the Intelligence? I mean not the habit imparted to the soul by the intellect, but the absolute Intelligence1; which, though above us, is also common to all men, or peculiar to each of them; in other words, is simultaneously common and individual. Common because…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,2 (I, 1, 2) — A alma como um agregado composto
THE SOUL AS A COMPOSITE AGGREGATE. 2. Let us first examine the soul (herself). Is there any difference between the soul and the soul-essence? If there be a difference, the soul must be a composite aggregate: and it should no longer be a matter of surprise that both she and her essence, at least so…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,3 (I, 1, 3) — A alma usa o corpo como instrumento
THE SOUL USES THE BODY AS TOOL. 3. Whether the soul, according to her being, be located in the body, above or within this latter, the soul forms with the body an entity called (a “living being” or) organism1. In this case, the soul using the body as a tool is not forced to participate…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,4 (I, 1, 4) — Consequências da mistura de alma e corpo
CONSEQUENCES OF MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY. 4. Now let us suppose the soul is mingled with the body. In this mixture, the worse part, or body, will gain, while the soul will lose. The body will improve by participation with the soul; and the soul will deteriorate by association with death and irrationality. Well,…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,5 (I, 1, 5) — O organismo vivo
THE LIVING ORGANISM. 5. The “living organism” must mean either the thus organized body, or the common mixture of soul and body, or some third thing which proceeds from the two first. In either of these three cases the soul will have to be considered impassible, while the power of experiencing passions will inhere in…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,6 (I, 1, 6) — Alma e corpo se unindo forma um agregado individual
SOUL AND BODY, BY UNITING FORM AN INDIVIDUAL AGGREGATE. 6. It would, however, probably be better to put the matter thus: by their presence, the faculties of the soul cause reaction in the organs which possess them, so that while they themselves remain unmoved, they give them the power to enter into movement1. In this…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,7 (I, 1, 7) — Alma-Luz forma a natureza animal
SOUL-LIGHT FORMS ANIMAL NATURE. 7. The aggregate results from the presence of the soul, not indeed that the soul enters into the aggregate, or constitutes one of its elements. Out of this organized body, and of a kind of light furnished by herself, the soul forms the animal nature, which differs both from soul and…
-
Guthrie: Tratado 53,10 (I, 1, 10) — Distinções entre «Nós» e «Homem Real»
DISTINCTIONS IN “WE” AND THE “REAL MAN.” 10. But if “we” are the “soul,” we must admit that when we experience passions, the soul experiences them also; that when we act, the soul acts. We may even say that the common part is also “ours,” especially before philosophy separated the soul from the body1; in…