Zwart (2009) – dialegesthai

Heidegger começa a sua discussão sobre o dialegesthai em Platão abordando a razão pela qual a filosofia de Platão é escrita em forma de diálogo. Heidegger defende que não é apenas porque Platão era um artista que preferia apresentar ideias filosóficas com uma linguagem bonita (Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 135 [195-196]). Pelo contrário, o modo de filosofar de Platão era exigido por uma “necessidade interior da própria filosofia”, uma exigência transmitida a Platão por Sócrates (Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 135 [195-196]). Nas palavras de Heidegger, o filosofar dialógico de Platão aborda o seu desejo de

passar do logos como tagarelice, daquilo que é dito de forma ociosa e apressada sobre todas as coisas, através de um falar genuíno, para um logos que, como logos alethes, diz efetivamente algo sobre aquilo de que fala. O dialegesthai é uma passagem “através do discurso”, partindo do que é dito ociosamente, com o objetivo de chegar a uma afirmação genuína, um logos, sobre os próprios seres.¹

Em Ser e Tempo, Heidegger dá-nos uma descrição mais completa da conversa fiada que o dialegesthai nos permite ultrapassar. Afirma que a conversa fiada (Gerede) não é um termo depreciativo, mas antes um termo que descreve o modo quotidiano como o Dasein fala e compreende. Quando comunicamos desta forma quotidiana, não compreendemos os entes sobre os quais estamos a falar, compreendemos apenas as palavras que são ditas sobre esses entes. Desta forma, somos capazes de dar a impressão, mesmo a nós próprios, de que compreendemos os entes em si, quando de facto não o fazemos.² De acordo com Heidegger, o tipo de compreensão alcançado na conversa fiada é superficial porque não exige que o falante ou o ouvinte tenham uma “relação primária-com-o-Ser em relação ao ente de que se fala… não comunica de forma a permitir que este ente seja apropriado de um modo primordial.”³ Desta forma, a conversa fiada actua como um impedimento à verdade, pois acredita-se que a compreensão de um determinado ente foi alcançada, e não se sente necessidade de procurar o ser mais primordial desse ente. Assim, a conversa fiada não só não acede à verdade em si, como permite, de facto, encobrir o ser do ente de que se fala.

This insight, that non-beings are, signifies at the same time a revolution in terms of the previous conception, in terms of the previous meaning of Being adhered to even by Plato himself. The interpretation of the mode of Being of the sophist ultimately counts as a demonstration of the Being of non-beings. This demonstration is nothing else than a more radical conception of the meaning of Being itself and of the character of the ‘not’ enclosed therein. And that implies a more original appropriation of the themes of philosophical research.. ..This more radical grasping and founding of research into Being entails at the same time a more fundamental interpretation of this research itself, i.e. of philosophizing.⁴

Having credited Plato with this revolutionary insight, Heidegger must consider how the being of non-beings becomes ‘present and evident’ or how the beings become disclosed in themselves (on alethinon) for Plato. According to Heidegger, the characteristic way in which beings are disclosed in Plato is in dialogue or discussion (dilegesthai), hence dialegesthai in Plato merits a closer look. Heidegger’s ensuing discussion of dialogue and dialectic in Plato will be important for our purposes because it is here that Heidegger eschews logos as the proper place of truth, but still suggests that dialectic is important for pointing in the direction of truth. This insight will be important evidence for the argument that Heidegger is critical of logos discourse in Plato, and as such it will serve as preparation for the argument that in spite of this critique of logos, Heidegger is charitable towards Plato’s muthos.

Heidegger begins his discussion of dialegesthai in Plato by addressing the reason that Plato’s philosophy is written in dialogue form. Heidegger contends that it is not merely because Plato was an artist who preferred to present philosophical ideas with beautiful language.⁵ Rather, Plato’s mode of philosophizing was demanded by an ‘inner need of philosophy itself,’ a requirement passed down to Plato from Socrates.⁶ In Heidegger’s words, Plato’s dialogical philosophizing addresses his desire to

pass from logos as prattle, from what is said idly and hastily about all things, through genuine speaking, to a logos which, as logos alethes, actually says something about that of which it speaks. Dialegesthai is a passing ‘through speech’ departing from what is idly said, with the goal of arriving at a genuine assertion, a logos, about beings themselves.⁷

In Being and Time Heidegger gives us a more thorough account of the idle talk that dialegesthai allows us to overcome. He claims that idle talk (Gerede) is not a disparaging term, but rather one that describes the everyday way in which Dasein speaks and comprehends. When we communicate in this everyday way, we do not understand the entities themselves about which we are talking, we understand only the words that are said about these entities. In this way, we are able to give the impression, even to ourselves, that we understand the entities themselves, when in fact we do not.⁸ According to Heidegger, the sort of understanding achieved in idle talk is superficial because it does not require the speaker or listener to have a ‘primary relationship-to-Being towards the entity talked about.. .it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner.’⁹ In this way, idle chatter acts as an impediment to truth for one believes that understanding of a given entity has been achieved, and feels no need to seek the more primordial being of that entity. Thus, idle chatter not only fails to access truth itself, in fact it allows the being of the entity talked about to be covered over.

But in Heidegger’s discussion of logos in the Sophist, it is important to notice that dialegesthai, unlike idle talk, is disclosive in nature. Dialegesthai allows one to move through the logos of everyday prattle to genuine logos. We have an instance here where Heidegger is critical of logos, but identifies Plato as getting something right—he avoids the pitfalls of idle chatter that are so common to Dasein on account of its reliance on logos. It is simply a fact of Dasein’s existence that it is bound up in logos. About this Heidegger writes:

Factually, however, it is precisely logos which ordinarily permeates all modes of uncovering, such that all the forms of aletheuein we saw in Aristotle, with the exception of nous, are determined by the character of the meta logou: they are carried out in discourse. Logos, addressing something in speech, is our most immediate mode of carrying out aletheuein, whereas nous, pure perception, is as such not possible for man, the zoon logon exon. For us, noein is initially and for the most part dianoein, because our dealing with things is dominated by logos.’¹⁰