alogos, ἄλογος, alogon, ἄλογον

A diferença é estabelecida no final do livro 1 da Ética a Nicómaco e fundamenta-se, por sua vez, numa diferenciação das partes ἄλογον e λόγον ἔχει da alma. À parte ἄλογα da ψυχή, designadamente aquela onde se encontra sediada o desejo, assiste a possibilidade de participar do λόγος, de alguma forma, de o escutar, mas de uma forma completamente diferente de que os objectos da matemática detêm λόγος. Estabelecida esta diferença é possível determinar duas excelências em campos diferentes da ψυχή: a διανοητική como a σοφία, a σύνεσις e a φρόνησις e por outro lado, a ήθική: a έλευθεριότης e a σωφροσύνη (1103a3-10). Gennadi V. Drac e V. V. Kondselka, «Aristoteles und Die Probleme der Antiken Wissenschaftstheorie», Phil., 131, 1987, pp. 109-118: «[…] für Aristóteles spielt die φύσις des Menschen eine normative Rolle» (p. 116). [CaeiroArete:294 Nota]

This possibility of hearing, this ἀκουστικóν [EN1 13, 1103 a 3], is more precisely found together with the mode of being that is fundamentally found in πρᾶξις, with ὄρεξις [EN1 13, 1102 b 30]. Every concern has tendency in itself; it is after something, directed at an ἀγαθóν that is always there as λεγóμενον, as “something addressed.” This being-after listens to what is spoken, to what is given in advance of that with which it should be concerned and how it should be concerned. We are seeing more clearly that concernful living, within which there is also the speaking that speaks in such a way that it thereby listens to itself. Ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λóγου speaks in such a way that it listens to itself. This concernful listening to the speaking itself is not, as ὄρεξις, genuine speaking; it is only speaking insofar as it listens to the speaking. To the extent that it is not genuine speaking, Aristotle designates it as ἄλογον [EN1 13, 1102 b 29, 34]. That does not mean that it lacks any relation to speaking, but that it is just not κυρίως [EN1 13, 1103 a 2]; ὄρεξις is not primarily speaking. Ἄλογον has a double-meaning in the full determination of the being of human beings [EN1 13, 1102 b28 seq.]: (1) not to be speaking in the sense of listening to speaking, (2) not to stand in the context of speaking at all, as θρεπτική, nourishing, reproducing are unrelated to λóγος and are unrelated to it in an entirely fundamental sense. The function of gastric juices has absolutely no relation to the speaking of human beings. Ἄλογον is therefore, on the one hand, determined with regard to θρεπτική; but then it is a being-possibility characterized by the ability-to-listen to speaking itself. Genuine speaking is being λóγον ἔχον κυρίως. [GA18:105-106; GA18MT:72-73]

Ἄλογον is made use of (1) for λóγον ἔχον in the mode of hearing, (2) for a how of being of living things that have no relation to speaking. Thus it must be kept in mind that the determination of θρεπτικóν and of αὐξητικóν are also fundamental being-determinations as is αἴσθησις. Even taking in nutrition would be viewed in a skewed manner if one were to apprehend it as a physiological process. Reproduction is bringing into the world; taking in nutrition is maintaining oneself in the world. [GA18:111; GA18MT:76]