Tag: psyche

  • bellezas del alma (Igal)

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    Según esta teoría, nada que sea simple, sino forzosamente sólo lo compuesto, será bello. Además, según esta teoría, será bello el conjunto, mientras que las partes individuales no estarán dotadas de belleza por sí mismas, pero contribuirán a que el conjunto sea bello. Y, sin embargo, si el conjunto es bello, también las partes deben…

  • esencia del alma (Igal)

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    Concedamos que es el compuesto el que siente por la presencia del alma, no porque un alma de tal calidad se entregue al compuesto o al otro componente, sino porque es ella la que, de la unión de un cuerpo específico con una especie de luz emitida por ella, produce la naturaleza del animal como…

  • imagen del alma (Igal)

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    Y las bestias, ¿cómo están en posesión del animal? Según. Caso de que, como se dice, habiten en ellas almas humanas que hayan pecado, toda la parte del alma que está separada no pasa a ser pertenencia de las bestias, sino que, estando presente, no está presente para ellas, sino que la consciencia no abarca…

  • interior del alma (Igal)

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    Entonces, nuevo problema: el pensar ¿es un término equívoco? En modo alguno. Hay un pensar primario y otro derivado y distinto. Porque del mismo modo que la palabra proferida es un trasunto de la interior del alma, así también la interior del alma es un trasunto de lo interior de otro. Del mismo modo, pues,…

  • naturaleza del alma (Igal)

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    Mejor será, sin embargo, considerar la cuestión en sí misma, y no con relación al objeto buscado, esto es, si hay algo que verdaderamente fluya de allí y si las cosas del cielo tienen necesidad de lo que, con lenguaje no apropiado, llamamos nosotros alimento. ¿O es que, una vez ordenadas las cosas del cielo…

  • Absolute-Soul (MacKenna)

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    It remains to decide whether only what is known in sense exists There or whether, on the contrary, as Absolute-Man differs from individual man, so there is in the Supreme an Absolute-Soul differing from Soul and an Absolute-Intellect differing from Intellectual-Principle. Ennead V,9,13 It must be stated at the outset that we cannot take all…

  • body and Soul (MacKenna)

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    Let us take first the Couplement of body and Soul. How could suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement? It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation…

  • collective soul (MacKenna)

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    They will object that parts must necessarily fall under one ideal-form with their wholes. And they will adduce Plato as expressing their view where, in demonstrating that the All is ensouled, he says “As our body is a portion of the body of the All, so our soul is a portion of the soul of…

  • Essential Soul (MacKenna)

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    This first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the Soul – that is whether a distinction is to be made between Soul and Essential Soul [between an individual Soul and the Soul-Kind in itself]. [NA: All matter shown in brackets is added by the translator for clearness’ sake and, therefore,…

  • Form-Soul (MacKenna)

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    But if Matter by very essence is evil how could it choose the good? This question implies that if Evil were self-conscious it would admire itself: but how can the unadmirable be admired; and did we not discover that the good must be apt to the nature? There that question may rest. But if universally…

  • higher soul (MacKenna)

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    Our own case is different: physically we are formed by that [inferior] soul, given forth [not directly from God but] from the divine beings in the heavens and from the heavens themselves; it is by way of that inferior soul that we are associated with the body [which therefore will not be persistent]; for the…

  • human soul (MacKenna)

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    Our opponents will probably deny the validity of our arguments against the theory that the human soul is a mere segment of the All-Soul – the considerations, namely, that it is of identical scope, and that it is intellective in the same degree, supposing them, even, to admit that equality of intellection. Ennead IV,3,1 We…

  • immortal soul (MacKenna)

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    They hope to get the credit of minute and exact identification by setting up a plurality of intellectual Essences; but in reality this multiplication lowers the Intellectual Nature to the level of the Sense-Kind: their true course is to seek to reduce number to the least possible in the Supreme, simply referring all things to…

  • individual soul (MacKenna)

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    Next there is the conception of the individual soul as a part in the sense in which we speak of some single proposition as a part of the science entire. Ennead IV,3,2 So it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges them to return to their source, but they have,…

  • Intellect and Soul (MacKenna)

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    As a mighty Intellect and Soul, he must be a principle of Cause; he must be the highest for several reasons but especially because to be King and Leader is to be the chief cause: Zeus then is the Intellectual Principle. Aphrodite, his daughter, issue of him, dwelling with him, will be Soul, her very…

  • Intellectual Soul (MacKenna)

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    They will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality. It is absurd to seek such a plurality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of immaterial beings whose existence is in Act – even in lower forms no such division can be made and…

  • nature of the Soul (MacKenna)

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    This first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the Soul – that is whether a distinction is to be made between Soul and Essential Soul [between an individual Soul and the Soul-Kind in itself]. [NA: All matter shown in brackets is added by the translator for clearness’ sake and, therefore,…

  • Ficino (Teologia Platônica:XVIII.2) – Anjos e almas nem sempre existiram

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    Estabelecemos uma hierarquia entre os corpos; estabeleçamos uma hierarquia entre os Espíritos. Há o Espírito superior, que sempre existiu e sempre existirá: é Deus. Há os Espíritos inferiores dos animais, que nem sempre existiram e nem sempre existirão. É necessário que entre esses extremos tão diferentes haja duas espécies de Espíritos intermediários, que participem tanto…

  • Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 8) — Sympathy between individual and universal soul comes from common source. (Guthrie)

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    SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. 8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We have already shown that there is one Soul (the…

  • Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 7) — Difference between individual and universal souls. (Guthrie)

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    DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. 7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by some. It only means what Plato desired to assert…