Plotino – Tratado 30,4 (III, 8, 4) — A natureza em repouso

Míguez

4. Sí se le preguntase por qué produce, tendría que contestar de este modo, caso de que quisiese prestarnos atención y decidirse a hablar: “No era necesario que se me preguntase, sino que convendría comprender y callar, como callo yo ahora, que no tengo la costumbre de hablar. ¿Y qué es lo que hay que comprender? Pues que el ser engendrado es para mí un objeto de muda contemplación y, mejor, el objeto natural de mi contemplación. Yo mismo he nacido de una contemplación así y siento una inclinación natural a contemplar; lo que en mí contemplo produce un objeto, al igual que los geómetras dibujan figuras cuando contemplan. Yo, sin embargo no dibujo ninguna figura, sino que contemplo, y las líneas de los cuerpos se cumplen como si realmente saliesen de mí. Se encuentra en mí la disposición de mi madre y de todos los que me engendraron; ellos mismos han salido de una contemplación y yo, por mí parte, he nacido antes de que ellos actuasen. Ahora bien, siendo ellos mejores razones que yo y contemplándose a sí mismos, no cabe duela que me han engendrado”.

¿Qué quiere decirse con esto? Simplemente, que lo que llamamos naturaleza es un alma, producto también de un alma anterior dotada de una vida más poderosa. Diremos de ella que encierra en sí una contemplación silenciosa, no dirigida ni a los seres de lo alto ni a los seres de abajo; pues al contrario, permanece tal cual es, en un estado de reposo y de conocimiento de sí, viendo, gracias a la inteligencia y al conocimiento que tiene de sí misma, las cosas qué le es posible ver, sin que le sea necesaria otra búsqueda para producir de una vez el objeto de su contemplación en la plenitud de su hermosura y de su gracia.

Si queremos atribuirle a la naturaleza la inteligencia y la sensación, no por eso hemos de hablar de una inteligencia y de una sensación análogas a las de los otros seres; porque en esto cabe la comparación entre el hombre dormido y el hombre despierto. Cuando contempla su objeto la naturaleza permanece en reposo. Se trata de un objeto nacido en ella, porque ella permanece en sí misma y consigo misma y es, además, un objeto de contemplación. Esta contemplación es silenciosa y un tanto confusa, porque, realmente, hay otra contemplación diferente de ella y mucho más evidente; digamos que la primera viene a ser una imagen de esa otra contemplación. De ahí también la completa debilidad de sus productos, porque una contemplación débil ha de producir necesariamente algo carente de fuerza. Así ocurre con los hombres: cuando se encuentran débiles para la contemplación, pasan en seguida a la acción, que es como una sombra de la contemplación y de la razón. Justamente, por no ser capaces de entregarse a la contemplación a causa de la debilidad de su alma, no pueden aprehender los objetos suficientemente y no se llenan, por tanto, de ellos; sí, en cambio, desean verlos, y para esto se aplican a la acción, tratando de ver con los ojos lo que no pueden ver con la inteligencia. Cuando, pues, producen algo, lo que quieren es verlo ellos mismos y hacerlo ver y sentir a los demás; eso es lo que les mueve a la acción, sin la medida de sus propias posibilidades.

Descubrimos por todas partes que la producción y la acción son un debilitamiento o un acompañamiento de la contemplación; debilitamiento, si luego de la acción nada nos queda por ver; acompañamiento, si podemos contemplar todavía una cosa mejor que la que se ha producido. Porque, ¿cómo un ser capaz de contemplar la verdad iba a preferir la imagen de la verdad? Lo prueba el hecho de que los niños más tardos, aquellos que son incapaces de aceptar la instrucción y la contemplación, son precisamente los abocados a los oficios y a los trabajos manuales.

Bouillet

IV. Après avoir parlé de la Nature, et expliqué de quelle manière la génération est pour elle une contemplation, passons à l’Âme qui occupe un rang supérieur à la Nature. Voici ce que nous avons à en dire.

Par son habitude contemplative, par son ardent désir de s’instruire et de découvrir, par la fécondité de ses connaissances et le besoin d’enfanter qui en est le résultat, l’Âme, étant devenue elle-même tout entière un objet de contemplation, a donné naissance à un autre objet ; de même que la science, arrivée à la plénitude, engendre par l’enseignement une petite science dans l’âme du jeune disciple qui possède des images de toutes les choses, mais seulement à l’état de théories obscures, de spéculations faibles, incapables de se suffire à elles-mêmes. La partie supérieure et rationnelle de l’Âme demeure toujours dans la région supérieure du monde intelligible, qui l’illumine et la féconde ; l’autre partie participe à ce que la partie supérieure a reçu en participant immédiatement à l’intelligible (16) : car la vie procède toujours de la vie, son acte s’étend à tout et est présent partout. Dans sa procession (προϊοῦσα), l’Âme universelle laisse sa partie supérieure demeurer dans le monde intelligible (car, si elle se détachait de cette partie supérieure, elle ne serait plus présente partout; elle ne subsisterait plus que dans la région inférieure à laquelle elle aboutit) ; en outre, la partie de l’Âme qui procède ainsi hors du monde intelligible n’est pas égale à celle qui y demeure. Donc, s’il faut que l’Âme soit présente partout, fasse sentir partout son action, et que ce qui occupe le rang supérieur diffère de ce qui occupe le rang inférieur; si en outre l’action procède de la contemplation ou de l’action [mais d’abord de la contemplation], parce que celle-ci est antérieure à l’action qui ne saurait exister sans elle ; s’il en est ainsi, dis-je, il en résulte qu’un acte est plus faible qu’un autre, mais qu’il est toujours une contemplation, de telle sorte que l’action qui naît de la contemplation semble n’être qu’une contemplation affaiblie : car ce qui est engendré doit toujours avoir la même nature que son principe générateur, mais en même temps être plus faible que lui, puisqu’il occupe un rang inférieur. Toutes choses procèdent donc silencieusement de l’Âme, parce qu’elles n’ont besoin ni de contemplation ni d’action extérieure et visible. Ainsi, l’Âme contemple, et la partie de l’Âme qui contemple, étant en quelque sorte placée en dehors de la partie supérieure et différente d’elle, produit ce qui est au-dessous d’elle : la contemplation engendre donc la contemplation (17). La contemplation, en effet, n’a pas de terme, non plus que son objet; voilà pourquoi elle s’étend à tout. Où n’est-elle pas? Toute âme a en elle-même objet de contemplation. Cet objet, sans être circonscrit comme une grandeur, n’est cependant pas de la même façon dans tous les êtres, par conséquent, n’est pas présent de la même manière à toutes les parties de l’âme (18). C’est pourquoi Platon dit que le conducteur de l’âme fait part à ses coursiers de ce qu’il a vu lui-même (19). Si ceux-ci reçoivent quelque chose de lui, c’est évidemment parce qu’ils désirent posséder ce qu’ils ont vu : car ils n’ont pas reçu l’intelligible tout entier. S’ils agissent par suite d’un désir, c’est en vue de ce qu’ils désirent qu’ils agissent, c’est-à-dire en vue de la contemplation et de son objet.

Guthrie

NATURE’S CONFESSION THAT HER MOTHER IS UNIVERSAL REASON, AND HER FATHER THE FORMAL REASONS.

4. (3). If anybody were to ask nature why she produces, Nature, if at all willing to listen and answer would say, “You should not have questioned me; you should have tried to understand, keeping silence, as I do; for I am not in the habit of speaking. What were you to understand? Here it is. First, what is produced is the work of my silent speculation, a contemplation effected by my nature; for, myself being born of contemplation, mine is a contemplative nature. Besides, that which in me contemplates, produces a work of contemplation, like geometricians who, while contemplating, describe figures. For it is not in describing figures, but in contemplating, that I let drop from within me the lines which outline the forms of the bodies. I preserve within me the disposition of my mother (the universal Soul), and that of the principles that beget me (the formal ‘reasons’). The latter, indeed, are born of contemplation: I was begotten in the same way. These principles gave birth to me without any action, or the mere fact that they are more powerful reasons, and that they contemplate themselves.”

DESCRIPTION OF NATURE AS A WEAKER CONTEMPLATION.

These words signify that nature is a soul begotten by a superior Soul that possesses a more potent life, and contains her contemplation silently within herself, without inclining towards that which is higher or lower. Abiding within her own essence (”being”) that is, within her own rest and self-consciousness, having discovered, so far as it was possible for her, what was below her, without going out of her way to seek it, nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object. If it is desired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature, these will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man who is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep. For nature peaceably contemplates her object, which was born in her as effect of nature’s abiding within and with herself, of herself being an object of contemplation, and herself being a silent, if weak contemplation. There is, indeed, another power that contemplates more strongly; the nature which is the image of another contemplation. Consequently, what she has produced is very weak, because a weakened contemplation can beget a weak object only.

IT IS MEN WHO ARE TOO WEAK FOR CONTEMPLATION THAT SEEK A REFUGE IN ACTION.

Likewise it is men too weak for speculation who, in action, seek a shadow of speculation and reason. Not being capable of rising to speculation, and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp that which in itself is intelligible, and to fill themselves therewith, though however desiring to contemplate it, these men seek, by action, to achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone. Thus we find that action is a weakness or result of contemplation, when we act, or desire to see, or to contemplate, or to grasp the intelligible, or try to get others to grasp it, or propose to act to the extent of our ability. It is a weakness, for, after having acted, we possess nothing of what we have done; and a consequence, because we contemplate something better than we ourselves have made. What man indeed who could contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image? This is the explanation of the taste for manual arts, and for physical activity (as thought Aristotle).

Taylor

IV. But if any one should ask nature for whose sake she operates, if he wishes to hear her speak, she would answer as follows: it is not fit you should interrogate me, but it becomes you to understand in silence, even as I am silent, and not accustomed to speak: but what is it you should understand? this, in the first place, that whatever is produced is my spectacle, produced while I am silent, a spectacle naturally produced; and that I, who spring from a certain contemplation of this kind, possess a nature desirous of beholding: hence that which retains in me the office of a speculative power, produces a spectacle or theorem, in the same manner as the geometrician, from speculating on his science, describes a variety of figures, yet the lines of bodies emanate from hence, not by my engraving them in matter, but drop, as it were, from the energy of my contemplation: indeed an affection is constantly preserved in me for my mother, and the sources of my being, for they derive their origin from contemplation, and my generation is also deduced from speculation, since while my parents, destitute of action and being reasons greater and more exalted than myself, speculate themselves, I am produced. But what are we to understand by this speech of nature? that nature herself is soul, produced from a soul more powerful and vivid, and which ever possesses in herself tranquil speculation, neither verging to things superior nor inferior to herself; so that ever abiding in her state, as far as her nature permits, through knowledge and consent, she knows what is posterior to herself, and without any farther inquiry, produces an agreeable and splendid spectacle. And if any one is desirous of assigning to nature a certain apprehension or sensation, he ought not to attribute to her a knowledge of the same kind as that of other beings, but in the same manner as if the knowledge of a man dreaming should be compared with the perceptions of the vigilant: for contemplating her spectacle she reposes; a spectacle produced in herself, because she abides in and with herself, and becomes her own spectacle and a quiet contemplation, though more debile and obscure; for the soul from which she is produced is endued with a more efficacious perception, and nature is only the image of another’s contemplation. On this account, what is generated by her is debile in the extreme, because a debilitated speculation produces debile spectacle; and hence it is that men, who are by nature more debile for the purposes of contemplation, rush into action, which is nothing more than the shadow of speculation and reason; for when the power of contemplation is wanting, and through the debility of the soul they are incapable of sufficiently beholding a mental spectacle, feeling a void within of something which they desire to perceive, they fly to action, that by this means they may at least discern the shade of a substance they could not behold with the eye of the mind. Indeed, we every where find that operation and action are either the debility or the consequence of contemplation; the debility indeed where nothing is possessed besides operation, but the consequence where an object of speculation is possessed superior to the produced work; for who blessed with a sound understanding when capable of beholding truth itself would make it his principal study to pursue the image of truth? And the truth of this is evinced in boys naturally stupid and dull, who, from their incapacity for learning and contemplation, rush into mechanical actions and arts.

MacKenna

4. And Nature, asked why it brings forth its works, might answer if it cared to listen and to speak:

“It would have been more becoming to put no question but to learn in silence just as I myself am silent and make no habit of talking. And what is your lesson? This; that whatsoever comes into being is my is my vision, seen in my silence, the vision that belongs to my character who, sprung from vision, am vision-loving and create vision by the vision-seeing faculty within me. The mathematicians from their vision draw their figures: but I draw nothing: I gaze and the figures of the material world take being as if they fell from my contemplation. As with my Mother (the All-Soul] and the Beings that begot me so it is with me: they are born of a Contemplation and my birth is from them, not by their Act but by their Being; they are the loftier Reason-Principles, they contemplate themselves and I am born.”

Now what does this tell us?

It tells: that what we know as Nature is a Soul, offspring of a yet earlier Soul of more powerful life; that it possesses, therefore, in its repose, a vision within itself; that it has no tendency upward nor even downward but is at peace, steadfast, in its own Essence; that, in this immutability accompanied by what may be called Self-Consciousness, it possesses — within the measure of its possibility — a knowledge of the realm of subsequent things perceived in virtue of that understanding and consciousness; and, achieving thus a resplendent and delicious spectacle, has no further aim.

Of course, while it may be convenient to speak of “understanding” or “perception” in the Nature-Principle, this is not in the full sense applicable to other beings; we are applying to sleep a word borrowed from the wake.

For the Vision on which Nature broods, inactive, is a self-intuition, a spectacle laid before it by virtue of its unaccompanied self-concentration and by the fact that in itself it belongs to the order of intuition. It is a Vision silent but somewhat blurred, for there exists another a clearer of which Nature is the image: hence all that Nature produces is weak; the weaker act of intuition produces the weaker object.

In the same way, human beings, when weak on the side of contemplation, find in action their trace of vision and of reason: their spiritual feebleness unfits them for contemplation; they are left with a void, because they cannot adequately seize the vision; yet they long for it; they are hurried into action as their way to the vision which they cannot attain by intellection. They act from the desire of seeing their action, and of making it visible and sensible to others when the result shall prove fairly well equal to the plan. Everywhere, doing and making will be found to be either an attenuation or a complement of vision-attenuation if the doer was aiming only at the thing done; complement if he is to possess something nobler to gaze upon than the mere work produced.

Given the power to contemplate the Authentic, who would run, of choice, after its image?

The relation of action to contemplation is indicated in the way duller children, inapt to study and speculation, take to crafts and manual labour.