VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we must speak as follows: That it is necessary then, there should be a certain subject to bodies, which is different from them, the mutation of the elements into each other manifests. For there is not a perfect corruption of that which is changed ; since if there was, there would be a certain essence which would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again, does that which is generated proceed into being from that which in every respect is not; but there is a mutation from one form into another. That, however, remains, which receives the form of the thing generated, and casts aside another form. This, therefore, in short, corruption manifests; for corruption is of that which is a composite. But if this be the case, each sensible thing consists of matter and form. This, too, induction testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is corrupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should be resolved into gold; but gold into water; and the water being corrupted, will require an analogous process. It is necessary, also, that the elements should either be form, or the first matter, or that which consists of matter and form. But it is impossible, indeed, that they should be form. For how, without matter, could they have bulk and magnitude ? Nor are they the first matter; for they are corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter and form. And form, indeed, subsists according to quality and morphe; but matter according to the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not form.
VII. Empedocles, however, who substitutes the elements for matter, has the corruption of them testifying against him. But Anaxagoras, who makes the mixture of things to be matter, and who says, that it has not an aptitude to (become) all things, but has all things in energy, subverts the intellect which he introduces; not assigning to it the production of morphe and form, nor asserting that it is prior to matter, but that it subsists in conjunction with it. It is, however, impossible that intellect and matter should be con subsist en t. For if the mixture participates of being, it follows that being is prior to it. But if being also is a mixture, a certain third thing is wanting to these. If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should have a prior subsistence, why is it necessary that forms should be in matter according to parvitude; and that afterwards intellect by a vainly laborious process should separate them from each other? For it is possible to impress quality in matter, since it is without quality, and to extend morphe through the whole of it. And, besides, is it not impossible that all tilings should be in every thing ? But he who asserts that the infinite is matter, should explain what this infinite is. And if it is infinite in such a way as that which cannot be passed over, it must be observed, that there is not any such things among beings, neither if it is the infinite itself, nor if it is inherent in another nature, as an accident to a certain body. It is not, indeed, the infinite itself, because the part of it is necessarily infinite. Nor is it the infinite as an accident, because that to which it is an accident would not be of itself infinite, nor simple, and therefore evidently would not be matter.
But neither have atoms the order of matter, which indeed have no subsistence whatever.1 For every body is entirely divisible. This opinion is also confuted from the continuity and moisture of bodies; and also from the impossibility of things subsisting without intellect and soul, which could not be formed from atoms. Again, it is not possible to fabricate any other nature, besides atoms from atoms; since no artificer is able to produce any thing from matter which is not continuous. Ten thousand other objections might and have been urged against this hypothesis, and therefore it is superfluous to dwell longer on these particulars.
VIII. What, then, is this nature, which is said to be one, continued, and void of quality ? And, indeed, that it is not a body if void of quality, is evident;2 for if it were, it would have quality. But we say that it is the matter of all sensibles, and that it is not the matter of some, but the form of others; as clay is matter to the potter, but is not simply matter. We do not, therefore, speak of it in this way, but with reference to all things; and this being the case, we must not attribute to the .nature of it any thing which is perceived among sensibles. Hence, besides not granting to it other qualities, such as colour, heat and cold, we must ascribe to it neither levity or gravity, neither density or rarity, or figure; and therefore, neither must we ascribe to it magnitude. For magnitude itself is one thing, and to be great another. And figure itself is one thing, and that which is figured another. It is necessary, however, that it should not be a composite, but simple, and one certain thing in its own nature. For thus it will be destitute of all things. And he who imparts morphe to it, will impart morphe as something different from matter. He will also prefer, as it were, magnitude and all things from the things which exist; for otherwise, he would be subservient to the magnitude of matter, and his production would not possess the quantity which he wished it should, but that which matter is capable of receiving. To assert, however, that the will of the artificer concurs with the magnitude of matter, is fictitious. But if the maker is prior to matter, in this case matter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it to be, and will with facility be brought to all things, and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it has magnitude, it is also necessary that it should have figure, so that it will be still more difficult to be fashioned by the artificer. Form, therefore, enters matter, bringing all things with it. But every form possesses magnitude, and the quantity which it contains is accompanied with reason (i.e. with a productive principle) and subsists under this. Hence, in every genus of things, quantity is defined together with forni. For there is one magnitude of a man, and another of a bird. And it would be absurd to suppose, that the introduction of quantity to the matter of a certain bird, is any thing else than adding to it its proper quality. Nor must it be said that quality is a productive principle, but that quantity is not form, since it is both measure and number.
IX. How then can any thing which ranks among beings be apprehended, which has no magnitude r Perhaps every thing which is not the same with a certain quantity. For being and a certain quantity are not the same; since there are many other things besides a definite quantity. And, in short, it must be admitted that every incorporeal nature is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal; since quantity itself is not a quantum (or a certain quantity), but that is a quantum which participates of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that quantity is form. As, therefore, a certain white thing is produced by the presence of whiteness; but that which produces a. white colour in an animal, and other various colours, is not a various colour, but a various productive principle; thus also, that which produces a definite quantity, is not a definite quantity, but a quantum itself, or quantity itself, or a productive principle. Does quantity, therefore, acceding, evolve matter into magnitude ? By no means. For it was not contracted into a small space; but it imparts magnitude which prior to this was not, in the same manner as it imparts quality which had not a prior existence.
X. What, therefore, is that which is void of magnitude in matter ? What, also, do you conceive that to be which is in a certain way void of quality ? And what is the intellection and the perception of it by the reasoning power ? Shall we say it is indefiniteness ? For if the similar is perceived by the similar, the indefinite also will be apprehended by the indefinite. Reason, therefore, will become hounded about the indefinite ; but the intuition of it will be indefinite. If, however, every thing is known by reason and intelligence, but here, reason indeed says what it is requisite to say about it, and wishing to become intelligence, is not intelligence, but, as it were, a privation of intellect, — if this be the case, the phantasm of matter will rather be spurious, and not genuine, being composed of an imagination which is not true, and another kind of reason. And perhaps, Plato, looking to this, says, (in the Timams) that matter is apprehended by a spurious reasoning. What, therefore, is the indefiniteness of the soul ? Is it an all-perfect ignorance, such as the absence (of knowledge) ? Or does the indefinite consist in a certain negation in conjunction with a certain affirmation ; and is it like darkness to the eye, obscurity being the matter of every invisible colour ? Thus, therefore, the soul also, taking away whatever in sensibles resembles light, and not being able to bound what remains, is similar to the eye placed in darkness, and then becomes in a certain respect the same with that which, as it were, it sees. Does it therefore see? Perhaps it sees matter as something deformed, and as void of colour, and void of light; and besides this, as not having magnitude, since if it had, it would be invested with form. When, therefore, the soul understands nothing, is she not affected in the same manner as when she sees matter? By no means. For when she understands nothing, she says nothing, or rather, she suffers nothing. But when she beholds matter, she suffers such a passion as when she receives the resemblance of that which is formless; since also when she understands things that have figure and magnitude, she understands them as composites. For she understands them as things diversified, and in short as possessing qualities. Hence, she understands the whole, and at the same time both, and her intellection or sensation of the inherent properties is clear and manifest. But her perception of a formless subject is obscure; for it is not form. When, therefore, in the whole and composite, she receives the subject together with its inherent properties, and analyzes and separates them, then she understands obscurely that which reason leaves, darkly that which is dark, and sees intellectually, not understanding. And since matter itself does not remain formless, but in (sensible) things is invested with form, the soul also immidiately impresses it with the form of things, being pained with the indefinite, as if afraid of being placed out of the order of beings, and not enduring to stop any longer at nonentity.
XI. But why is it requisite there should be something else besides magnitude and all qualities/to the composition of bodies? Or is it not necessary there should be that which is the recipient of all things ? It will not therefore be bulk. For if it were bulk, it would also be magnitude. But if it is without magnitude, it will not have a place where it may receive (all other things). For being void of magnitude, what advantage would it derive from place, if it neither contributes to form and quality, nor to interval and magnitude ? the two latter of which appear to be derived to bodies from matter, wherever it may be. In short, as actions and productions, times and motions, though they have no substratum of matter in them, yet rank among beings; thus, also, neither is it necessary that the first bodies should have a matter (which is without magnitude), but that each of them should be wholly that which it is, being more various by the mixture with things that have their composition from many forms. So that this matter which is without magnitude, is a vain name. In the first place, therefore, it is not necessary that whatever receives any thing should have bulk, if magnitude is not now present with it; since soul, likewise, which receives all things, has all things at once. But if it happened to have magnitude, it would possess every thing that it contains, in magnitude. Matter, however, on this account, receives the things which it receives, in interval, because it is the recipient of interval; just as animals and plants, while they are extended with magnitude, receive at the same time the production of quality; and quantity being contracted, quality also is contracted. If, however, because a certain magnitude pre-exists in things of this kind, as a subject to the formator, some one should also require this in matter, he will not conceive rightly. For in the formation of these, not matter simply considered, is employed, but matter of a certain kind. But it is necessary that matter simply considered, should possess magnitude from something else. Hence, it is not necessary that the recipient of form should be bulk, but that at the same time it becomes bulk, it should receive another quality; and that it should have indeed the phantasm of bulk, because, as being the first matter, it is an aptitude to the reception of it. It is, however, a void bulk; and hence some assert that matter and a vacuum are the same. For the soul having nothing which it can bound, when it associates with matter, diffuses itself into the indefinite, neither circumscribing it, nor being able to arrive at any fixed point (of survey 😉 since otherwise it would define it. Hence, neither is it to be separately called great, nor again small; but it must be denominated both small and great. And thus it is bulk, and thus is without magnitude, because it is the matter of bulk. Being also contracted from the great to the small, and extended from the small to the great, it rims as it were through bulk. The indefi-niteness of it, likewise, is a bulk of this kind, being the receptacle of magnitude in itself; but in imagination in the way before explained. For with respect to such other things without magnitude as are forms, each of them is definite; so that they bring with them no conception whatever of bulk. But matter being indefinite, and never at rest with itself, and being borne along to every form, in every direction, and easily led every where, becomes multitudinous by its generation and transition to all things. And after this manner it possesses the nature of bulk.
XII. Magnitude, therefore, contributes something to bodies; for the forms of bodies, are in dimensions. These forms, however, are not generated about magnitude, but about that which is amplified. For if they were generated about magnitude, and not about matter, they would be similarly void of magnitude and without, subsistence, or would be productive principles alone. But forms are conversant with soul, and therefore are not bodies. Hence, it is necessary that here, many things should subsist about one thing; but this is distended with magnitude. And this (which is thus amplified,) is different from magnitude ; since now also such things as are mingled, in consequence of having matter, pass into a sameness of condition, and do not require any thing else about which they may subsist, because each of the things that are mingled brings with it its own matter. At the same time, however, a certain recipient is necessary, viz. either a vessel, or place. But place is posterior to matter, and to bodies; so that bodies prior to this will be indigent of matter. Nor does it follow that because productive energies and actions are immaterial, on this account bodies also are without matter. For the latter are composites, but this is not the case with actions. Matter also imparts a subject to agents when they act, abiding in them, but not giving itself to act; for this is not investigated by matei’ial agents. Nor is one action changed into another, in order that matter may be in them; but the agent passes from one action to another, so that he has the relation of matter to the actions themselves. Matter, therefore, is necessary both to quality and magnitude, so that it is also necessary to bodies. Nor is it a vain name, but it is a certain subject, though it is invisible, and without magnitude. For if this is not granted, neither must we say that there are qualities; and for the same reason we must deny the existence of magnitude. For each of these, if assumed by itself alone, must be said to be nothing. But if these have a subsistence, though each of them obscurely exists, much more will matter have an existence, though it does not clearly subsist, and is apprehended, though not by the senses. For it is not perceived by the eyes, since it is without colour. Nor by the hearing; for it has no sound. Nor by the smelly or the taste; for it has neither moisture, nor vapour. Is it, therefore, perceived by the touch ? Or is not this impossible, because neither is it a body ? For the touch pertains to body, because it pertains either to the dense, or the rare, the soft, or the hard, the moist, or the dry. None of these, however, subsist about matter; so that it is perceptible by reasoning, but not by sense; and by a reasoning not derived from, but void of intellect, on which account, as we have before observed, this reasoning is spurious. But neither is corporeity about matter. For if corporeity is a productive principle, it is different from matter. But if it is a thing now made, and as it were mingled, it will evidently be body, and not matter only.
XIII. If, however, the subject of things is a certain quality, being something common in each of the elements, in the first place indeed, it must be shown what it is. And, in the next place, how quality can be a subject must be explained. How, likewise, can a thing which has quality be surveyed in that which is without magnitude, and without matter ? Likewise, if the quality is defined, how can it be matter r But if it is something indefinite, it is not quality, but a subject, and matter which we are now investigating. – “What hinders, therefore, but that it may indeed be void of quality in consequence of not in its own nature participating any one of other things, and yet through not participating of any thing, it may be endued with quality, entirely possessing a certain peculiarity, and differing from other things, being as it were a certain privation of them r For he who suffers a privation of anything, as for instance, a blind man, is (it may be said) a participant of quality. If, therefore, there is a privation of these things about matter, how is it possible it should not be endued with quality? But if, in short, there is privation about it, it is in a still greater degree a participant of quality, if privation is a certain something that has quality. He, however, who thus objects, what else does he do than make all things to be qualities, and the participants of quality? So that quantity, and also essence, will be quality. And if each of these is such like, quality will be present with it. It is, however, ridiculous to make that which is different from the participant of quality, and which is not such like, to be endued with quality. But if it should be said, this is because a thing that is different is a participant of quality, Ave reply, if indeed it is difference itself, it will not subsist as a thing that is such like, since neither is quality the participant of quality. If, however, it is different alone, it is not alone different through itself, but through difference, and is the same through sameness. Neither, therefore, is }>rivation quality, nor the participant of quality, but is destitute of quality, or of something else, just as silence is the absence of sound or of some other thing. For privation is a negation. But a thing endued with quality consists in affirmation. The peculiarity, likewise, of matter is not morphe; for not to possess quality is not to possess a certain form. It is absurd, therefore, to call that thing quality, which is not a participant of quality, and is just as if it should be said that a thing without magnitude, in consequence of being without, possesses magnitude. The peculiarity, therefore, of matter, is not any thing else than that which matter is: nor is its peculiarity adjacent to it, but rather subsists in a habitude to other things, because matter is different from them. And other things, indeed, are not only others, but each of them is a certain thing as having form. Matter, however, may be aptly said to be alone that which is another. Perhaps, also, it may be appropriately denominated other things, lest by calling it in the singular number another, you should limit (its boundless nature😉 but by denominating it others, you will indicate the indefiniteness of its subsistence.
XIV. That, however, is to be investigated, whether matter is privation, or privation subsists about matter. He, therefore, whd says that both are one in subject, but two in definition, ought in justice to teach us what definition of each should be given. And to the definition of matter, indeed, he should adapt nothing of privation ; and to the definition of privation, nothing of matter. For either the one is not in the definition of the other, or each is in the definition of each, or one of them only is in the definition of the other, whichever it may be. If, therefore, each is defined separately, and neither of them requires the other, both will be two things, and matter will be different from privation, though privation may happen to it. In the definition of the one, however, it is necessary that the other should not be seen, not even in capacity. But if they are as a flat nose, and flatness of the nose, thus also each of them is twofold and two. And if they are as fire and heat, heat being in fire, but fire not being assumed in heat, and matter is so privation as fire is hot, — in this case, privation will be, as it were, the form of matter, but the subject will be another thing, which it is necessary should be matter. Neither, likewise, in this way will they be one. Are they, therefore, thus one in subject, but two in definition, privation not signifying that a certain thing is present, but that it is not present, and privation being as it were a negation of beings, as if some one should say non-being ? For negation does not add any thing, but says a thing is not, and thus privation will be as non-being. If, therefore, it is non-being, because it is not being but something else, will there be two definitions ; the one indeed regarding the subject, but the other privation, manifesting a habitude to other things? Or shall we say, that the definition of matter respects other things, and that this is also the case with the definition of a subject; but that the definition of privation, if it manifests the indefiniteness of it, will perhaps touch upon its nature, excepting that each is one in the subject, but two in definition ? But if privation in consequence of being indefinite, infinite, and without quality, is the same with matter, how will there be any longer two definitions ?
XV. Again, it must be investigated, whether if the infinite and indefinite are in another nature accidentally, how this is an accident, and whether privation happens to it. If, indeed, such things as numbers and reasons (or productive principles) are remote from infinity; for they are boundaries and orders, and arrangement is derived to other things from these ; but these arrange not that which is arranged, nor the orders of things, that which arranges being different from that which is arranged; and end, bound, and reason, arrange; — if this be the case, it is necessary that what is arranged and bounded, should be infinite. Matter, however, is arranged, and also such things as are not matter, by participating or possessing the nature of matter. Hence it is necessary, that matter should be infinite, yet not infinite in such a way as if the infinite was accidental to matter. For in the first place, that which happens to any thing ought to be formative; but the infinite is not formative. In the next place, to what existing thing will the infinite be an accident ? Will it be to bound, and that which is bounded? Matter, however, is neither any thing bounded, nor bound. The infinite, also, acceding to that which is bounded, loses its own nature. Hence, the infinite is not an accident to matter. Matter, therefore, is the infinite;. since in intelligibles also, matter is the infinite which is there.3 And there, indeed, it is generated from the infinity or power of the one, or from the ever, infinity not being in the one, but proceeding from it. How, therefore, is the infinite there, and also here? Or is not the infinite twofold? And in what do they differ? They differ in the same manner as archetype and image. Is the latter, therefore, in a less degree infinite ? Perhaps it is more infinite. For so far as the image flies from the reality of existence, so far it is in a greater degree infinite. For infinity is in a greater degree in that which is less bounded. For that which is less in good is more in evil. Hence the infinite which is in intelligibles, in consequence of having more of being, is but as an image (with respect to the infinity of matter). But the infinite which is here, as having less of being, so far as it flies from existence and truth, and is drawn down to the nature of an image, is a more true infinite. Is, therefore, the infinite the same thing as to be infinite? Perhaps where there are that which has a productive and forming power, and matter, each of these is different; but where there is matter alone, they must either be said to be the same, or in short, and which also is better, to be infinite is not here. For it would be reason in order that it might be infinite (i.e. would have a productive and forming power,) which is not in the infinite. Hence matter must be said to be of itself infinite, through having an arrangement opposite to reason. For as reason not being any thing else is reason, thus also it must be said, that matter being opposed to reason according to infinity, is infinite in such a way as not to be any thing else.
XVI. Is, therefore, matter the same witli difference, or is it not the same ? Perhaps it is not the same with difference simply considered, but with a part of difference which is opposed to beings properly so called, and which are productive principles. Hence, also, non-being is thus a certain being, and the same with privation, if privation is an opposition to the things which subsist in reason. Will, therefore, privation be corrupted by the accession of that of which it is the privation? By no means. For the receptacle of habit, is not habit, but privation. The receptacle, likewise, of bound, is not that which is terminated, nor bound, but the infinite, and this so far as it is infinite. How is it possible, therefore, that bound approaching should not destroy the nature of the infinite, especially since this infinite has not an accidental subsistence ? Or may we not say that if this infinite was infinite in quantity, it would perish ? Now, however, this is not the case, but on the contrary its being is preserved by bound.
For bound brings that which the infinite is naturally adapted to be, into energy and perfection; just as that which is not yet sown (is brought to perfection) when it is sown, and as the female (when impregnated) by the male. For then the female nature is not destroyed, but possesses the female characteristic in a greater degree; since then it becomes more eminently that which it is. Is, therefore, matter evil when it partakes of good ? Or shall we say it is evil on this account because it was in want of good ? For it did not possess it. For that which is in want of any thing, and obtains what it wants, will perhaps become a medium between good and evil, if it is equally disposed towards both. But that which possesses nothing, as being in poverty, or rather being poverty itself, is necessarily evil. For this is not the want of wealth or of strength, but it is the want of wisdom, and the want of virtue, of beauty, strength, morphe, form, and quality. How, therefore, is it possible it should not be deformed ? How is it possible it should not be perfectly base ? How is it possible it should not be perfectly evil ? The matter, however, which is in intelligibles is (real) being. For that which is prior to it is beyond being. But here (in the sensible region,) that which is prior to matter is being. Hence the matter which is here is not being, since it is different from it when compared with the beauty of being.
i.e. As things perfectly indivisible. ↩
Though from the arguments adduced here by Plotinus, it appears to be impossible that the first matter should be body void of quality, yet I think there will not be any absurdity in admitting with Simplicius, that body is twofold, one kind as subsisting according to form and productive power, and defined by certain intervals; but another as characterized by intensions and remissions, and an indefiniteness of an incorporeal, impartible, and intelligible nature: this not being formally defined by three intervals, but entirely remitted and dissipated, and on all sides flowing from being into non-being. ” Such an interval as this, we must perhaps,” (says Simplicius) ” admit matter to be, and not corporeal form, which now measures and bounds the infinite and indefinite nature of such an interval as this, and which stops it in its night from being. Matter, however, is that by which material things differ from such as are immaterial. But they differ by bulk, interval, division, and things of this kind, and not by things which are defined according to measure, but l»y things void of measure and indefinite, and which are capable of being bounded by formal measures. The Pythagoreans appear to have been the first of the Greeks that had this suspicion concerning matter but after them Plato, as Moderatus also informs us. For he, conformably to the Pythagoreans, evinced that the first one is above being, and all essence ; but he says, that forms are the second one, which is true being and the intelligible; and that the third one, which is psychical, or belonging to soul, participates of the one, and of forms. He adds, that the last nature from this, and which is the nature of sensibles, does not participate them, but is adorned according to a representation of them, matter which is in them being the shadow of the non-being, which is primarily in quantity, or rather depending on and proceeding from it. According to this reasoning, therefore, matter is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to non-being.
Those things, indeed, which are the properties of sensibles are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into generation, viz. into matter; for matter is always truly the last sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life, which they symbolically denominate water, matter, being as it were a certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and sensible natures, nut subsisting as any definite form, but as the state or condition of subsistence ; just .as the impartible, the immaterial, true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an intelligible nature; all forms, indeed, subsisting both here and there, but here materially, and there immaterially; viz. there impartibly and truly, but here partibly and shadowy. Hence, every form is here distributed according to material interval.” See more on this subject in the notes to Hook I. of my translation of Aristotle’s Physics. ↩
“Power,” says Proclus, (in Theol. Plat. lib. iii. cap. 9.) “is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power, indeed, being the cause of occult multitude ; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause, therefore, I think that every being, and every essence, has con-nascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is one many. — It appears to me also, that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as analogous to the one, and to hyparxis, hut power as analogous to matter. And if, indeed, they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it.” See my translation of this work of Proclus, vol. i. p. 173. ↩