noûs: inteligência, intelecto, espírito
1. A busca de uma ordem ou de um princípio ordenador está implícita tanto na mitologia como na filosofia gregas desde os princípios, nos mitos pela aplicação de um arranjo genealógico que remonta a uma fonte original ou «pai» para a confusão de deuses derivados de uma variedade de fontes, e entre os filósofos milésios pela sua procura de uma arche. Esta última procura de um «pai» das coisas recebeu a sua confirmação inicial com a descoberta de um «pai» que consumiu todos os seus «filhos», i. e., o on de Parmênides. Mas o regresso a uma fonte é só um tipo de ordem, e os pensadores com orientação de espírito muito diferente investigaram o problema noutras direções. Há, insiste Heráclito, uma ordem oculta sob as aparências das coisas, ordem que ele descreve como o logos (q. v. 1). Os pitagóricos foram ainda mais longe: descobriram que esta ordem podia ser expressa em termos matemáticos (ver harmonia) e, tornada explícita, que podia ser aplicada ao universo como um todo (ver kosmos).
2. As condições cinéticas impostas por Parmênides haviam levado os seus sucessores a postular uma espécie de motor externo para explicar a mudança no mundo sensível (ver kinesis 2, kinoun 1). Para o fazer Empédocles entrara na esfera moral por hipóstases das forças motoras humanas do «Amor» e do «Ódio» (ver kinoun 2), mas pela sua escolha de um motor Anaxágoras voltou-se para outra tradição. O que Parmênides fizera na ontologia fora já realizado na teologia por Xenófanes. Parte da luta de Xenófanes contra o antropomorfismo (ver mythos 1, theos 1) foi a sua insistência em que Deus deve ser completamente imóvel (frg. 26; aqui o argumento baseia-se em «o que é adequado», prepon, um motivo estético, moral e teológico recorrente) e realiza os seus fins pelo poder do seu espírito (noûs) apenas (frg. 25). Estes pontos de vista estão prenhes de futuros desenvolvimentos. Além de estabelecer, aqui no começo do discurso teológico, a natureza intelectual de Deus, a opinião de Xenófanes enfrenta o problema da sua atividade no mundo e tira a conclusão de que esta deve realizar-se sem qualquer mudança no próprio Deus (ver Esquilo, Suppl. 96-103). Dada a dificuldade do tratamento deste tema, a sua determinação fica para outros (ver kinoun 9, pronoia 2, proodos 2).
3. Anaxágoras volta à noção de Deus de Xenófanes com noûs ao postular uma força motriz que faz com que a «mistura» original rode e se separe em vários elementos (ver genesis 7). Porque a hipóstase moral de Empédocles foi substituída por um princípio intelectual, noûs, que é separado da massa sobre a qual atua (frg. 12; mas também é curiosamente imanente; ver noesis 4). A sua operação é descrita como «ordenadora» (diakosmesis), e conhece todas as coisas, o passado, o presente e o futuro (frg. 12 cont.). Aqui, portanto, a ordem pitagórica e heraclítica do universo, governada, segundo Heráclito (frg. 64), pelo fogo todo-universal, é posta sob a tutela de uma força intelectual e finalizada cujo conhecimento abarca não só os acontecimentos do passado e do presente mas também os do futuro.
4. O aer de Diógenes de Apolônia, o qual no seu estado aquecido é o noûs (ver noesis 5), é mais uma arche dos Milésios do que um kinoun pós-parmenidiano (ver noesis 4), mas tem um sentido de finalidade ainda mais fortemente desenvolvido (telos). Tanto Sócrates (Fédon 97b) como Aristóteles (Metafísica 984b) tinham criticado Anaxágoras pelo seu uso mecanicista do noûs, mas Diógenes é um pouco mais cuidadoso no tratamento do problema. A operação do aer – noûs é testemunhada pelo fato de que todas as coisas operam de acordo com um princípio de medida (metron) e da melhor maneira possível (frg. 3; o seu próprio exemplo é a sucessão regular das estações).
Para a história subsequente destes motivos teleológicos, ver telos. (Termos Filosóficos Gregos, F. E. Peters)
(Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads AP)
(The One produces Noûs without any movement or change in Itself by a sort of emanation or radiation. The product is necessarily less than the producer; but since the One is the most perfect of all things, its product is necessarily that which is next in order of perfection, namely Noûs.)
How then does Noûs see, and what does it see? How did it come into existence at all and arise from the One so as to be able to see? The soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed, even by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if It is such as we say It is, a multiplicity or a duality or a number come into existence. Why did It not remain by Itself? How did so great a multitude flow from It as that which we see to exist in beings but think it right to refer back to the One?
Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking God Himself, not in spoken words, but reaching out with our soul into prayer to Him; for in this way we can pray alone to Him Alone. The man who contemplates Him, as if inside the temple,1 existing by Himself, remaining quiet beyond all things, must contemplate what correspond to the images already standing outside the temple, or rather that one image which appeared first; and this is the way in which it appeared. Everything which is moved must have some end to which it moves. The One has no such end, so we must not consider that It moves. If anything comes into being after It, we must think that it necessarily does so while the One remains continually turned towards Itself.1 We must admit then that what comes into being from the One does so without the One being moved: for if anything came into being as a result of the One’s being moved, it would be the third starting from the One, not the second, since it would come after the movement. So if there is a second after the One it must have come to be without the One moving at all, without any inclination or act of will or any sort of activity on Its part.
How did it come to be then? And what are we to think of as surrounding the One in Its repose? It must be a radiation from It while It remains unchanged, just like the bright light which surrounds the sun, which remains unchanged though the light springs from it continually. Everything that exists as long as it remains in being, necessarily produces from its own substance, in dependence on its present power, a surrounding reality directed towards the external world, a kind of image of the archetype from which it was produced. Thus fire produces its heat: snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist they diffuse something from themselves around them which everything near them enjoys. Again, all things when they come to perfection produce. The One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and Its product is less than Itself. What then must we say about the Most Perfect? Nothing can come from It except that which is next greatest after It. Noûs is next to It in greatness and second to It; for Noûs sees It and needs It alone; but It has no need of Noûs. That which derives from something greater than Noûs is Noûs itself, which is greater than all things, because other things come after it. So Soul is a Logos and a kind of activity of Noûs, as Noûs is of the One. (V. I. 6)
Soc. That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene “mind” (Noûs) and “intelligence” (dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her ; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine intelligence” (Thou noesis), as though he would say : This is she who has the mind of God (Theonoa) ; — using a as a dialectical variety e, and taking away i and s. Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean “she who knows divine things” (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her the name ethonoe ; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene. CRATYLUS
There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names, who would never have connected prophecy (mantike) which foretells the future and is the noblest of arts, with madness (manike), or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed madness to be a disgrace or dishonour ; — they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was a noble thing ; for the two words, mantike and manike, are really the same, and the letter t is only a modern and tasteless insertion. And this is confirmed by the name which was given by them to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs — this, for as much as it is an art which supplies from the reasoning faculty mind (Noûs) and information (istoria) to human thought (oiesis) they originally termed oionoistike, but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (oionoistike and oionistike), and in proportion prophecy (mantike) is more perfect and august than augury, both in name and fact, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind (sophrosune) for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in certain families, owing to some ancient blood-guiltiness, there madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for those who are in need ; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and except from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from the calamity which was afflicting him. The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses ; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers ; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses’ madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art — he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted ; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman. PHAEDRUS
Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common : these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges ; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment ; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum ; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed, Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that necessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear — of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice : — All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary, for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined ; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the different notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in our : own as compared with other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge, shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner ; otherwise there would be no meaning the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (Noûs, nomos). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case — of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may say truly again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city. LAWS BOOK XII