Tag: agathon

  • Não devemos perseguir [a visão do bem] (Plotino)

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    Plotino 5.5 [32] 8 (3-7) (tr. Barrie Fleet) Não devemos perseguir [a visão do bem], mas permanecer em silêncio até que ela apareça, preparando-nos para sermos seus espectadores – assim como os olhos aguardam o nascer do sol, que aparece no horizonte (ou no Oceano, como dizem os poetas) e se mostra ao nosso olhar.…

  • Amor – Bem – Beleza (Ficino)

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    Ficino, 1594 Até aqui falamos [do amor] sobre sua origem e nobreza. Agora creio que devemos falar sobre sua utilidade. E certamente é supérfluo enumerar cada um dos benefícios que o amor confere ao gênero humano, sobretudo quando podemos reduzi-los todos a ele. Pois tudo se resume nisto: que, uma vez evitado o mal, sigamos…

  • Regra para louvar o amor. Qual a sua dignidade e grandeza (Ficino)

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    Ficino, 1594 Todo filósofo platônico considera que toda coisa possui três aspectos: o que a precede, o que a acompanha e o que a segue. Se esses aspectos são positivos, a coisa é elogiada; se são negativos, é criticada. A perfeição do elogio reside em examinar sua origem, descrever seu estado atual e apresentar seus…

  • Good and Beauty (MacKenna)

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    We may even say that Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence: and the Ugly is also the primal evil; therefore its contrary is at once good and beautiful, or is Good and Beauty: and hence the one method will discover to us the Beauty-Good and the Ugliness-Evil. Ennead I,6,6…

  • Authentic Good (MacKenna)

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    It can scarcely prove to be The Good: The Absolute Good cannot be thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it only as something of the nature of good but paying a double allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic Good. Ennead I,2,4 Now if happiness did indeed…

  • Good and Bad (MacKenna)

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    To deny Evil a place among realities is necessarily to do away with the Good as well, and even to deny the existence of anything desirable; it is to deny desire, avoidance and all intellectual act; for desire has Good for its object, aversion looks to Evil; all intellectual act, all Wisdom, deals with Good…

  • good man (MacKenna)

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    Take, for example, Contemplative-Wisdom. If other guides of conduct must be called in to meet a given need, can this virtue hold its ground even in mere potentiality? And what happens when the virtues in their very nature differ in scope and province? Where, for example, Sophrosyne would allow certain acts or emotions under due…

  • good or evil (MacKenna)

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    But, to begin with, it is surely unsound to deny that good of life to animals only because they do not appear to man to be of great account. And as for plants, we need not necessarily allow to them what we accord to the other forms of life, since they have no feeling. It…

  • Highest Good (MacKenna)

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    And, further, these Civic Virtues – measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as Matter to their forming – are like to the measure reigning in the over-world, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme; for, while utter measurelessness is brute…

  • nature of the Good (MacKenna)

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    For the moment let us define the nature of the Good as far as the immediate purpose demands. The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term…

  • good soul

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    (376b) Socrates : Is not, then, a good man he who has a GOOD SOUL, and a bad man he who has a bad one ? LESSER HIPPIAS Socrates : It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is,…

  • good of the soul

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    Soc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only GOOD OF THE SOUL is pleasure ; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other GOOD OF THE SOUL,…

  • goods of the soul

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    Soc. Next, let us consider the GOODS OF THE SOUL : they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like ? MENO Str. In the second place, he was a merchant in the GOODS OF THE SOUL. SOPHIST Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy,…

  • Jowett: Philebus 15c-17a — Dialética

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    Pro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. Soc. That is what I should wish. Pro. And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed ; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up with questions.…

  • Filebo 39c-40e — Um prazer ou uma dor são opiniões sobre o futuro

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    Sócrates – Se estiver tudo certo tudo o que dissemos até aqui, precisaremos examinar ainda o seguinte ponto. Protarco – Qual? Sócrates – Se as ocorrências presentes e passadas produzem necessariamente esses efeitos em nós, porém não as frutas. Protarco – O mesmo se dará em qualquer tempo com todas. Sócrates – Há pouco falamos…

  • Jowett: Philebus 14c-20a — Prazer e sabedoria: problema capital da filosofia

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    Soc. Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests. Pro. What principle ? Soc. A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their will. Pro. Speak plainer. Soc. The principle which has just turned up, which is a…

  • Jowett: Philebus 13d-14c — Anfibologia da noção de sabedoria

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    Pro. How do you mean ? Soc. Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you ? Pro. What question ? Soc. Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be…

  • Jowett: Philebus 12b-13d — Anfibologia da noção de prazer

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    Soc. Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. Pro. Very good. Soc. The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human — it exceeds all other fears. And now I…

  • Jowett: Philebus 11a-12b — Prólogo

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    Socrates. Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides ? Protarchus. By all means.…

  • Filebo 26e-27c — A Causa

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    XIV – Sócrates – Mas também dissemos que, além desses três gêneros, havia a considerar um quarto. Ajuda-me a pensar. Vê se te parece necessário que tudo o que devém, só se forme em virtude de determinada causa. Protarco – Sem dúvida; pois, sem isso não poderia formar-se. Sócrates – E também não será certo…